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The EU and its member countries have recently at the March 2010 European Council meet-
ing reiterated their commitment to ambitious long term goals to deal with climate change 
and energy security. To this end, the EU is ultimately committed to take a decision whether 
to move to a 30% reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels as a first step to achieve the 
ultimate target of staying below a 2°C increase in global temperatures compared to pre-
industrial levels.  
 
This will in practice require substantial reduction in energy related CO2 emissions and de-
ployment and development of low carbon energy technologies. In this context, the study fo-
cuses on the importance of taxation of carbon and energy as a spur for innovation in such 
technologies, containing two main elements: 
 
  A policy based literature review of specific and direct links between energy taxes 
and innovation and in that context reporting the results of a major new economet-
ric study using micro and macro data. 
 
  A policy based literature review of the merits of taxation relative to innovation and 
R&D policies in attaining long term climate goals. 
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1.1.  TAXATION OF GREENHOUSE GASES AND ENERGY KEY DRIVER FOR INNOVA-
TION 
The advantage of using taxation to spur innovation in energy technologies is just a mirror 
image of the advantage of using taxation to abate emissions in general.  By taxing directly the 
quantity – for example emission of CO2 – the same incentive across all fields of innovation 
will be made available in order to save energy and/or reduce CO2 emissions. Hence remov-
ing the need for policy makers to “guess”, based typically on incomplete information, where 
innovation activities should be focused.  
 
The effects on innovation are of an “induced” nature containing three steps. First, appropri-
ate tax regimes can make it more expensive for private and industrial consumer to use (fossil) 
energy sources. Second, this in turn increases the demand for technical solutions that either 
save energy or use low fossil content energy sources and thereby improving the economic vi-
ability of such technologies. Thirdly, this (re)directs the innovation efforts of enterprises in 
that direction; this is what we term “induced” innovation. 
 
These effects are not just of a theoretical nature, but are demonstrated in many applications 
of energy use over many decades.  Our review of the literature suggest that the long term ef-
fects of capturing all the three effects imply that an increase in energy prices or taxes of 1 per 
cent often leads to a fall in energy use of 1 per cent of more (c.f. chapter 2.1 for details). 
 
In this study, we review the empirical literature on induced innovation effects, and we con-
duct own empirical investigations of the relationship.  
 
We will highlight the three most important conclusions from the new empirical research in 
this study seen from a policy perspective (c.f. chapter 2.4 for details). 
 
First, substantial increases in energy taxation can drive forward very substantial increases in 
innovation. Looking at seven different technology classes, we find (statistically significant) 
positive impacts on patenting activities from energy taxation for five technologies. The two 
other technologies related to lighting have too small effects to be well determined statisti-
cally. Our results suggest that a one percentage point increase in the tax share of total user 
costs induces a 0.3-2.4 percentage increase in patenting, c.f. Table 1.1. This is indeed quite 
substantial. 
 
Table 1.1: Price and tax effects for different technologies 
Technologies  Lighting  LED  Biomass in 
buildings 




Price  effect  0  0 0.28  0 0 0 0.47 
Tax effect  0  0  0.28  2.33  2.37  2.19  0.47 
Note: Long run estimated elasticities significant at 5 % confidence level. Due to the estimation strategy, taxes will 
always ‘inherit’ the price effect, but will be flexible to deviate if statistically significant. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
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Second (and closely related to the first conclusion), the tax induced innovation is signifi-
cantly higher than the price induced innovation. This highlights the role of taxation as a 
credible long term instrument sending the right investment signals to innovators. As such, 
this conclusion is well supported by the literature, see chapter 3.1-3.2. However, we have 
reasons to believe that part of the difference between taxes and prices in our empirical results 
may be attributed to methodological issues.  
 
Third, the speed and size of innovation effects from energy/carbon taxes depend on a num-
ber of well defined characteristics of the products and processes affected by the tax which are 
discussed in more detail in the report, c.f. chapter 2.2-2.3. In particular: 
  
  Energy use is typically just one (cost) component of a broader service produced by 
different types of capital equipment: gasoline is inserted into a car to produce a 
transport service; electricity is inserted into a light bulb to allow it to light up 
rooms etc. The higher the cost share presented by energy costs of deployment of 
the energy consuming product, the bigger the relative effect on user costs from 
energy taxes. In short, a 20 per cent increase in energy prices will lead to larger in-
creases in the costs of using a car than a computer. This implies that the choice of 
a computer will be less driven by its energy consumption than the choice of a car 
would be. In turn this implies that energy cost driven innovation will be focused – 
naturally – in areas where energy account for a large share of the costs. 
  The speed of effect: the time from increase in taxes to effective introduction of 
new technology depends very much on the production and innovation cycle in 
the particular industry. The lead time from a higher tax rate to a patent is 4-5 
years on average and then it needs to be converted into real products that will be 
deployed in the market over time. We can expect quick effects with simple, 
though highly energy consuming, products like hair dryers (not investigated here); 
slower effects with cars; and longer term effects on, e.g., heavy industrial equip-
ment used in paper and pulp production. See chapter 2.4 and 3.3 for more on 
speed and time lags. 
 
In addition to providing support for these findings, our literature review provides the follow-
ing two main conclusions useful in assessing the size and adequacy of price/taxation induced 
innovation: 
 
The first conclusion is that global or at least regional tax rates should have broader and 
stronger effects on innovation than isolated tax rates in a few countries. The basic reasoning 
is that innovation strategies will be driven by simple market size concerns: the larger the 
market affected by a tax on energy, the larger the incentives for firms to spend their scarce 
innovation resources on responding to such taxes. As a counterpart to this, the innovation 
gains that small countries can achieve by imposing unilaterally higher tax rates on their own 
consumers and industries will be limited by two types of “leakage”. First, firms may consider 
relocation rather than investments in abatement technology. Second, firms producing poten-  Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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tial abatement technology may hold back on such investments because the local markets ac-
count only for a fraction of their global sales. See chapter 2.3 for more details. 
 
The second and very important conclusion relates to specific policy design and is partly de-
rived from the conclusions above: 
 
  Some patience is needed in reaping the benefits of tax driven innovation with the 
speed depending on the length of product and innovation cycles. These lead times 
are important to keep in mind when setting instruments for obtaining medium ver-
sus long term climate targets. 
  However, even if contributions to year 2020 targets from taxation induced innova-
tion may be limited due to lead times, taxation will still be an extremely important 
instrument as the immediate effects on primary consumption and shifts towards 
energy efficient equipment will be the main engine through which these targets can 
be achieved. 
  In addition, for innovation with long expected time lags, it is essential to establish a 
long term credibility of maintained high level of tax rates to fix incentives for in-
vestment.. This is also discussed below. 
1.2.  R&D POLICIES AS A SUPPLEMENT TO TAXATION 
While taxation can be a very effective driver of innovation in energy technologies, there are 
two basic arguments suggesting that energy/carbon taxation needs to be complemented with 
public research grants and other technology policies supporting long term innovation. 
 
The first is the so-called double externality problem.  Carbon pricing is imposed because the 
costs for the society of emissions exceed the costs of private or industrial consumer that emit 
it. Hence, in line with standard environmental policy principles, by imposing a carbon price, 
we at one and the same time make the polluter pay and reduce emissions. However, at the 
same time, we have a classical externality problem in the production of knowledge: the bene-
fits to the society from particular basic science may well exceed the private benefits from 
producing it (see also chapter 3.1). 
 
The second argument is the long term nature of innovation efforts and, linked to this, the 
credibility problem policy makers are facing. Private firms will only invest in research now to 
reap future benefits if they believe that the policy framework in place when innovation ef-
forts are turned into products and processes will reward them for their efforts. However, pol-
icy makers will also know that once firms have spent billions of Euros on R&D, they will 
seek to bring the new products to the market, provided that the marginal revenues of doing 
so exceed marginal costs of production. So policy makers may promise high taxes on carbon 
forever but drop them once firms have made the irreversible R&D investments. 
   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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This conclusion though raises the question: How much can the costs of attaining climate 
change and energy policy objectives be reduced by supplementing taxation of emissions with 
direct public support?  We will argue that it depends on two main issues.  
 
The first issue is classical within the field of R&D economics. Public research grants require 
public funding with resulting distortions from higher tax rates. (A typical estimate is that 1 
Euro spent on R&D requires benefits equal to 1.20 Euro or more to compensate for distor-
tions.). Furthermore, increased innovation driven by public funding in one field of eco-
nomic activity tends to squeeze out other innovation activity including privately funded 
R&D. However, according to several contributions from the economic literature, R&D 
support is usually considered to bring forth more economic benefits than what it costs to 
tax-payers, at least in the dynamic context. 
 
This provides a clear trade-off.  The benefits to be reaped by producing positive spill-overs 
from energy technologies need to exceed the costs of lost innovation elsewhere as well as dis-
tortions from higher tax rates to fund R&D subsidies. By contrast, revenues from energy 
taxes can be recycled so as to neutralise their adverse effect on the labour market. 
 
The second issue is more directly related to the level of ambitions that the EU has commit-
ted itself to, and the time frame for attaining these. To be very clear, the benefits that the EU 
can expect from new public research grants initiatives between 2010 and 2020 in meeting 
2020 objectives should be relatively limited. As discussed above, the time lag from spending 
on R&D to results being deployed in new products and processes is often measured in dec-
ades. Moreover, reducing CO2 and other greenhouse gases by 20 per cent – 30 per cent in 
the context of a wider global agreement – can largely and effectively be met by deploying ex-
isting energy efficient technologies helped by carbon pricing. Moreover, substantial im-
provements of these technologies will become economically viable for producers with rela-
tively modest increases in carbon pricing. 
  
Moving beyond 2020 objectives, the picture becomes different. Reducing CO2 emissions 
with 50 to 80 per cent from 1990 levels while seeing continued growth will imply either 
massive reductions in energy intensity or the introduction of new low carbon technologies in 
a scale not seen before. The cost to consumers of such a drastic change in living pattern 
would be very large, hence increasing vastly the value of technologies that could provide low 
carbon energy.  These findings are confirmed in a number of recent studies. 
 
However, the increasing weight of R&D support to attain long term goals in climate and 
energy policies does not imply that taxation becomes less relevant over time. Indeed, a num-
ber of studies have shown that carbon prices will have to rise further beyond 2020 even with 
very ambitious R&D policies. 
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1.3.  TAXATION NEEDED TO REAP BENEFITS OF R&D POLICIES 
Well targeted R&D policies focused on solving research externalities still need to be backed 
up by continued strong carbon pricing by way of taxes and/or cap-and-trade systems. There 
are three basic arguments.  
 
First, public R&D support to increase the energy efficiency of fossil fuel technologies – 
combustion engines etc – will lead to more energy efficient cars on the roads, but also to 
lower costs of driving. Recent research from Germany suggests that up to 60 per cent of the 
energy savings from more energy efficient cars are transformed into consumers driving 
longer distances and or buying cars with more performance, a pattern often called the re-
bound effect.  
 
Secondly, for end-of-pipe technologies such as coal based Carbon Capture and Storage 
power plants, the benefits are exclusively CO2-savings, while the output – electricity – is ex-
actly the same as for traditional fossil based power plants. So these plants will never be de-
ployed unless they receive a premium when selling electricity:  despite up-front subsidies to-
tal costs per unit sold will exceed traditional power plants.  It is the role of carbon pricing to 
deliver this premium. 
 
Thirdly, R&D policies supporting renewable energy may well lead to a reduction in demand 
for fossil fuel, but that will at the same time lead to a reduction of crude oil, coal and gas 
prices on a global scale, triggering higher second round demand for such fossil fuels. The 
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From an economic perspective, taxes are a cost-efficient instrument in climate change miti-
gation. Taxes (as well as emission trading schemes) create clear economic incentives to re-
duce pollution, whilst being easy to implement. Alternatives, such as technology standards, 
typically only create medium term effects, unless continuously updated. A key problem with 




However, the full abatement effects from energy taxation will most often first be seen dec-
ades after the introduction. Basically, this stems from the three step nature of the reactions of 
consumers and producers to change in economic incentives. To be more specific about the 
difference between the three effects, we need to make clear that energy demand is a derived 
demand, derived from the demand for the output of some processes, e.g., a car engine pro-
viding transportation, c.f. Figure 2.1. The short run effect of a tax (price) increase on energy 
inputs is that we reduce the amount of transportation. The medium run effect is that we buy 
smaller and less energy consuming cars, while the long run effect is that we invent hydrogen 
cars. Note the interdependence amongst the effects. If consumers are not hurt by the tax in-
crease in the short run in form of reduced transportation, they are not likely to change their 
behaviour in the medium run either, and so there is no market for new inventions.  
  































































reduce activities creating pollution (e.g. 
less transportation)
conduct activities in less polluting way 
using known technologies (e.g. smaller 
and more fuel efficient cars)
conduct activities in less polluting way 
using new technologies (e.g. hydrogen 
cars)
Note: The choice of the Kyoto reduction target only serves as an example   
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
                                                           
1Popp et al (2009) 
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 In this study we focus on this third element, the longer term effect on innovation. But it is 
very important to understand that this innovation is an induced or derived effect from con-
sumers’ and producers’ short, medium and long run reactions to price changes. If consumers 
do not react to prices by consuming less energy and/or change the composition of energy-
consuming capital, then innovators will not put research funds into innovation.
2 
 
We will structure this chapter according to these three channels. First, in section 2.1, we 
briefly review evidence of how private and industrial consumers over time have reacted to 
changes in energy prices, including changes originating from taxes.  Second, in section 2.2, 
we review more directly how penetration of low carbon technologies has been impacted by 
energy and tax prices. Thirdly in section 2.3, we measure how innovation activities as meas-
ured by different indicators typically with medium to long term lags have responded to such 
consumer behaviour. Finally, in section 2.4, we present new econometric evidence of the ef-
fect of energy prices and taxes in four areas of energy use, reviewing seven different tech-
nologies. 
2.1.  REACTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL TAX AND PRICE INCREASES 
Taxes provide incentives for consumers and firms to reduce energy consumption with the 
existing holdings of electric appliances, cars, production machinery etc. However, as long as 
the capital stock is held fixed, the only possibility is to reduce the level of pollution creating 
activities. In the medium to long run, consumers and industries will also change the compo-
sition of the capital stock towards environmentally friendly technologies thereby creating 
further reductions in pollution. 
Can we estimate direct tax impacts? 
Direct and robust estimates of long term effects of taxes on energy consumption and devel-
opment of new technologies are difficult to obtain as energy taxes historically have been rela-
tively sparsely used. This is evident from Table 2.1 where we see that energy taxes typically 
only amount to a few percent of GDP in the USA, Japan and EU countries. Energy taxes are 
mainly focused on gasoline, with low taxation of inputs for heating (represented by oil).  
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Table 2.1: The importance of energy taxes in EU, US and Japan, 2007 
  
Electricity tax, euro / 
GJ.  Gasoline tax, euro / GJ Diesel oil tax, euro / GJ 
Revenue from energy 
taxes as share of GDP 
EU, high (67 percentile)  26  26 21 3,5 
EU, middle (33-67 percentile)  9  23 17 2,5 
EU, low (33 percentile)  5  20 15 1,6 
USA 0  3  3  0,8 
Japan 2  17  7  1,7 
Note: Energy taxes share of GDP includes all environmental taxes. These numbers are for 2007. The tax on elec-
tricity, gasoline and diesel consist of all taxes paid by the end-user, excluding VAT. 
Source: IEA Data services and OECD, http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/TaxInfo.htm 
 
 
Despite the significant change in policy focus around the world between 1994 and 2007, 
environmental taxes do not seem to have become more important during this time period, 
c.f. Figure 2.2. Obviously, the tax revenue to GDP ratio is also influenced by more than the 
level of environmental taxes. For example, a high GDP growth and a diminishing public sec-
tor could imply that the ratio would fall. However, in the period we consider, neither of 
these explanations seems to be of major importance. 
  
Figure 2.2: Environmental tax revenues, share of GDP, 1994-2007 







1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Pct.
EU High,  average  (DK, NL, PT, FI, CZ)
EU Middle, average  (SE, HU, LU, IE, AT, UK, DE, FR, SK)
EU Low, average (BE, EL, IT, ES, PL)
Japan 
United States   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Hence, when seen from the macro level over the last three decades, energy taxes have had 
only a limited impact on the level and variation of end user prices relevant for decisions by 
private and industrial consumers in most EU Member States. However, some exceptions ex-
ist, e.g., a few household end-user products such as gasoline and fuel oil, c.f. Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: Energy taxes across products (excl. VAT), share of total end use prices in EU 
Note: Simple  average 
Source:  IEA Data services 
 
Given the limited overall importance of environmental taxes, empirical work on the effects 
of taxation have to look at the historical effects from changes in energy prices as well as 
changes in tax rates
3.  A priori, we would expect demand reactions to be similar for a tax rais-
ing the product price by 1 percent and a cost increase also raising the price by 1 percent. In-
deed, the literature provides a large range of studies determining the behavioural response 
from general price changes including changes in tax rates.
4 
 
As an introduction to this literature, we need to underline the role played by demand elastic-
ities, i.e., the percentage change in consumption by a percentage change in final price. In the 
next subsection, we will present ranges of elasticity estimates. If consumers do not respond to 
price increases in the short or medium run, i.e., we face zero price elasticity, then there is lit-
tle role to be played by taxes in climate change mitigation. The behavioural change is neces-
                                                           
3 See Killian (2007) for a good survey on impacts from energy price fluctuations. 
4 Popp (2002) discusses this point for the direct price-patent relationship and concludes that price and tax move-
ments will have similar impact. Flood et al (2010) uses a more elaborate political economy approach to examine dif-
ferences in price and tax impacts on gasoline demand. They conclude that from a demand side perspective, which is 
relevant here, the impacts are equal. However, there seems to be a political response to tax levels from price fluctua-














































































































Gasoline, tax share of total end-use price
Fuel oil, tax share of total end use price
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sary not only for the direct impact on pollution, but also on the economic incentives for 
conducting expensive R&D in green technologies.  
 
There are obvious methodological problems in getting price elasticities right. First, the de-
mand for fossil fuel inputs is not only determined by price, but also by income. Richer na-
tions use more fuels, and as the world economy grows, energy demand increases. Thus, esti-
mating elasticities requires an adequate control for income effects. Second, equilibrium ef-
fects must be taken into account. Observed data must be seen as both demand and supply 
responses, and disentangling demand from supply effects requires some methodological basis 
or identifying assumptions. Third, in the interpretation of elasticities it is important to dis-
tinguish between pure consumption reduction and simple fuel substitution. For example, an 
elasticity of 1 may consist of 0.5 pure reductions in energy consumption and 0.5 substitu-
tions to alternative energy sources. Obviously, when energy taxation hits the pollution di-
rectly as in the case of carbon taxes, then substitution towards zero-carbon energy sources 
must be included as a potential beneficial response to taxes. But in the case of a specific fuel 
tax, say on oil, substitution towards natural gas is less beneficial. At this point, we should 
clarify that in this study, we are essentially looking at both substitution and pure reduction. 
Innovation can take place within low-carbon technologies and within energy-efficiency. 
 
Baring in mind these uncertainties, it seems relatively clear that long term effects from taxa-
tion can be substantial. In the next paragraph we will show such demand responses in more 
detail. 
Medium to long run elasticities can be substantial 
Looking across a very wide range of studies on the price elasticity of energy demand, there is 
a wide consensus that long term effects are two to three times higher than short term ones 
and are substantial, typically exceeding unity. This literature actually started as early as 1951 
and despite the refinements in methodologies and broader availability of data, consistently 
with this contribution estimates are still found in the ballpark of 0 to -0.5 in the short run 
and -0.5 to -2 in the long run, c.f. Figure 2.4. The figure captures 67 studies with more 273 
different elasticity estimates. Moreover, the figure demonstrates that measured as bands of 
estimates there is not that much difference between sectors and energy products. The only 
exception is residential demand which seems to have somewhat lower long run elasticity. 
However, it seems to be a reasonable assertion that long run estimates are typically not too 
far from -1.    Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Figure 2.4: Short and long run elasticity estimates across sectors and products 
 
 
Note: The elasticities represented are based on a large number of empirical studies which are reviewed in the studies 
mentioned below as sources. 



























Fuel oil short 
run
Fuel oil long run Natual gas 
short run
Natural gas 
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Table 2.2: Elasticity estimate averages across energy types and sectors 
Energy type  Short run  Medium run  Long run 
Coal  0.08 -  0.30 
Electricity  0.23 0.49 1.15 
Gasoline  0.22 -  0.65 
Natural gas  0.28 1.15 1.72 
Oil 0.15 0.66 1.73 
Aggregate energy  0.23 0.40 0.63 
Households  0.225 0.549 1.24 
Commercial  0.256 0.26 1.57 
Industrial  0.239 0.762 1.34 
Sourc: Same sources as in figure 2.4 
 
On the other hand, one may ask for the source of variation in these estimates. A few recent 
studies, in form of meta-analyses, have tried to assess this.
5 The conclusions are as follows 
(further explanations follow): 
 
  The empirical methodology may influence the results significantly 
  Elasticities change over time and with price levels 
  Countries with similar economic structure may have quite different elasticities 
 
Concerning the influence from the empirical methodology, meta-analyses show that some 
40-50 percent of the variation may be attributed to methodological differences, implying 




The most important difference arises from the data itself: Cross-country vs. time series esti-
mations. Time series data have the advantage that the underlying economic entity with its 
basic structures is not changing between data points. Cross country data have the advantage 
that larger variations are typically present.
7 
 
When it comes to changes over time, a meta-analysis explicitly shows that electricity elastic-
ities increased by 0.7 in absolute terms (that is, from, say, -1.0 to -1.7) immediately after the 
first oil price hike around 1973.
8 Similar magnitudes are found for gasoline demand elastic-
ities. We give three interpretations to this result. 
 
                                                           
5 See Espey and Espey (2004), Brons et. al. (2006), and Brons et al (2008). 
6 See Espey and Espey (2004), Brons (2005), and Brons et et al (2008). 
7 This touches a classic discussion in much applied analysis during the last decades. For an example directly discuss-
ing the difference between data types and estimates, see Gardes et al (1996). 
8 See Espey and Espey (2004).   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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The first interpretation concerns the ability of statistical methods in general to capture elas-
ticities when there is little price variation; estimates simply become too low because the 
methods cannot distinguish the small variations from noise.
9 From a very general point of 
view, econometrics is all about separating data signals from data noise, but this task becomes 
more and more difficult as the level of noise increases. When we give this interpretation of 
statistical difficulties, it will imply that the true elasticity values are about 0.7 lower in abso-
lute terms than typical estimates (higher in numerical terms). 
 
The second interpretation concerns a change in attitudes and thereby in behaviour. The oil 
price hike brought another focus on energy savings and therefore consumers changed their 
behaviour. This interpretation is also backed up by a study from the US demonstrating that 
consumers reacted more strongly to energy prices when energy standards became obligatory 
thus allowing consumers to pick the products that were most energy efficient.
 10 
 
A third interpretation simply takes the result at face value and concludes that iso-elastic de-
mand curves do not describe behaviour very well. Instead, elasticities are increasing in price 
levels.
11 This is consistent with the assertion that elasticities are higher when energy costs are 
relatively high compared to output (GDP). 
 
Finally, we seem to find evidence that differences are substantial across countries. Some of 
this may be explained by economic and political structures,
12 some of it by differences in 
technical structures. A good example where market design matters is the case of electricity re-
tail prices. Historically, these have been determined ex post (in order to keep zero profits of 
regulated firms) in many countries. This completely eliminates any short/medium run re-
sponses in demand. Moreover, some of the country differences can also be attributed to the 
level of attention / attitudes.  
 
Taken as a whole, the above discussion suggests that elasticities increase with price levels and 
with the general level of attention towards energy scarcity / environmental issues. Further-
more, we can see that the rate structure can increase the long run elasticity by app. -0.5 for 
electricity when marginal (short run) rates vary with consumption. 
 
From a policy perspective the literature therefore provides three simple lessons:  
 
(i)  Energy tax policies work well when consumers are informed about products 
and alert about consequences.   
                                                           
9 It is standard knowledge in the econometric profession that low variation causes less precise estimates, c.f. Greene 
(2003). Moreover, low signal-to-noise ratios generally lead to downward biases of estimates, and low variation may 
cause simultaneity biases (relevant in non-system estimation of elasticities) to increase. 
10 Gillingham et al (2006) 
11 Bernstein and Griffin (2005), Espey and Espey (2004). 
12 For example, France is known for a weak coupling between end user electricity prices, and wholesale market 
prices.   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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(ii)  Energy tax policies work well when consumers are given the opportunity to re-
act in the short run. 
(iii)  Stronger effect when overall energy costs are high. 
 
The first point suggests the use of information standards and campaigns,
13 while the second 
suggests that policy makers should strive for transparent pricing systems. However, some-
times politicians attempt to counteract price fluctuations by levying taxes and subsidies.
14 In 
other words, the economic and informational context must be put in place.
15 The third les-
son is related to a specific market aspect, but it may suggest that taxation as an instrument 
has the advantage of increasing effectiveness as the level increases. 
 
However, the main finding here is that medium and long run elasticities seem to be eco-
nomically significant. This strongly suggests that consumers and industries are willing to 
substitute towards green technologies, and this conclusion is extremely important for taxes to 
play a role in the deployment and development of low carbon technologies. 
2.2.  ENERGY PRICES AND TAXES EFFECT ON PENETRATION OF LOW CARBON 
TECHNOLOGIES 
In this section we move the focus from pure consumption reductions by consumers and in-
dustries to more fundamental changes in the way we use energy. Most of these effects con-
cern medium run adjustments in capital holdings, and we will focus on three areas: 
 
  Renewable energy sources for electricity 
  Energy efficient household appliances. 
  Fuel efficient cars 
Renewable energy sources for electricity 
A moderate carbon price will be sufficient to make profitable a substantial amount of non-
fossil energy systems in the power system. Figure 2.5 shows the estimated global production 
costs of electricity for different renewable technologies compared to coal. It shows that with 
a carbon price of 30 euro / tonne, a range of renewable technologies come close to being 
competitive. That is, they have the same production costs as coal when including the 30 
euro / tonne price. However, the figure also shows that without a carbon price, coal is gener-
ally cheaper than most of the other existing technologies. While most of these technologies 
are today supported by direct subsidies, most estimates suggest that tightened climate poli-
cies resulting in higher prices of ETS allowances would be sufficient to make substantially 
further amounts of renewable energy economically viable, c.f. Figure 2.5.  
                                                           
13 Campaigns serve to improve attention to environmental costs and to provide guidance to possible energy cutting. 
From a classical economics perspective, such campaigns are of little value since they provide no hard (financial) in-
centives. Modern economic theory, however,  acknowledges the  
14 See Flood et al (2010). 
15 See also Suslov (2008) for a general result on this point.   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Figure 2.5: Projected cost ranges for power production across technologies, 2020-2030 
 
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009 and CE calculations 
Adoption of energy efficient household appliances 
The high average electricity price over the past years (2000-2004) seems to have led to con-
sumption choices with a higher penetration of energy efficient appliances in the period of in-
terest (2005).
16 Hence in countries with high electricity taxes such as Denmark, The Nether-
lands and Sweden, the share of highly efficient household appliances – those marked in en-
ergy class A and A+ - is much more widespread.
17  A more in-depth study for US showed 
that over a time span of 30 years, rising energy prices have led to innovation in energy con-
suming household appliances, and that more energy efficient models were offered for sale 
(and actually sold). Here, it is also emphasised that additional information about energy use, 
directs consumer behaviour towards more energy efficient appliances.
18 One should take this 
example to note the general point that the link between taxation and energy efficiency is in-
directly through prices. Some countries may have high prices without having significant 
taxes and vice versa. However, the tax always adds to the price and therefore helps moving 
the adoption towards energy efficient appliances. 
 
                                                           
16 Conducting a simple regression between penetration and average electricity price results in a coefficient of 1.59 
(i.e., a 1 $-cent/KWh increase leads to a 1.59 percent increase in penetration of energy efficient appliances) with a 
corresponding t-value of 2.16 being significant at the 5 percent level. 
17 Bertoldi and Atanasiu(2007) 
18 Newell et al (1999) 
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Figure 2.6: Penetration of energy efficient household appliances 
Note: Electricity price including tax. We define energy efficient appliances as refrigerators, freezers, washing ma-
chines, dishwashers and ovens rated A or better. The penetration rate shown in the graph is an average 
weighted with total sales.   
Source: Copenhagen Economics based on Bertoldi, P. & Atanasiu, B., (2007) and IEA Energy price and tax data-
base. 
Fuel efficient cars 
The effects of energy prices and energy taxes on the fuel efficiency of cars deployed are evi-
denced in a number of studies including our own simple graphical representation below in 
Figure 2.7. The difference in end user gasoline prices between countries seems to affect dif-
ferences in average fuel efficiency. Higher gasoline prices provide incentives to improve the 
fuel efficiency of cars.
19 The variations away from the trend line can, to a large extent, be ex-
plained by historical and demographic differences. Considering the two largest EU Member 
States, Germany and France, it should be no surprise to find Germany above and France be-
low the line. Germans have a tradition for larger and therefore less energy efficient cars, 
while the French typically tend to drive smaller cars. In Sweden, the low energy efficiency 
probably stems from the longer distances inducing higher driving comfort. Such conclusions 
are also reached in more elaborate modelling attempts.
20 Other empirical analyses show that 
the fuel efficiency response to gasoline price are alike in different regions, whereas the final 
energy demand is influenced by different price elasticities when it comes to numbers of cars 
owned and demand for transportation.
21  
 
                                                           
19 A simple linear regression with fuel efficiency as the dependent variable and gasoline price as regressor yields a t-
value of -3.7 which is significant at the 1 percent level.  This corresponds to a 2.5 liters/100 km increase in fuel effi-
ciency if gasoline prices rose by 1 $/Ltr.  
20 Eftec (2008). 
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Figure 2.7: Gasoline price levels and fuel-efficiency; Average new gasoline LDV fuel effi-
ciency and end-use gasoline prices, 2004
22 
Source: IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 p. 436 and World Development Indicators, Table 3.12 
 
We also attempt to show evidence that changes in gasoline prices over time within countries 
affect fuel efficiency. Below is shown the development of end-user price on gasoline for 
Germany, France, the UK, and the US compared to the development of fuel-efficiency on 
new gasoline LDV’s in the corresponding countries. The data only allows us to cover the pe-
riod from 1980 onward.  For the UK there is a sharp rise in fuel efficiency up to 1985, 
where it stabilizes in a period with falling and low gasoline prices. As the gasoline prices start 
rising again from 1991 onward, there is a following increase in the fuel efficiency, starting 
with some years lag. The delay can be explained by consumers waiting to see if a new higher 
gasoline price is just temporary: a more energy efficient, but perhaps also more costly and 
less attractive car in terms of performance, will only be chosen if the price change turns out 
to be of a more permanent character which may take some years to establish. 
 
 
                                                           
22 The above figure lists the fuel price for gasoline in the respective country vs. the average fuel efficiency for new 
gasoline driven cars in the respective countries. For Australia and Japan the average fuel efficiency is based on both 
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Figure 2.8 UK gasoline prices and fuel efficiency for new gasoline LDV’s 
The UK  Germany 
France The  US 
 
Source:  IEA data services for gasoline prices and IEA data from MoMo-model, upon written request 
 
A similar picture is seen below for France, though consumer behaviour tends to react a bit 
faster. For Germany the effect from gasoline prices on fuel efficiency is more moderate. This 
can be the result of the above mentioned fact that the Germans tend to drive larger and less 
energy-efficient cars possibly resulting from preferences for comfort and car size. 
 
US data is available for a longer period, and we see rising fuel efficiency up until 1985, as a 
lagged response to the second oil crisis. The new regime of falling oil prices are transmitted 
into a period with zero growth in fuel efficiency, then to recently beginning to rise as a re-
sponse to the growing gasoline prices since 1999. 
 
A variety of literature studies examines the changes in gasoline prices over time and the effect 
on consumer choices. In a recent study for the US market, the market share of the 25 per 
cent most fuel efficient cars is estimated to rise by 20 percent in response to a 1 USD rise in 
gasoline prices.
23 Moreover, the share of larger SUV’s is also estimated to be affected by the 
gasoline prices in the sense that the average fuel efficiency of new sold cars rises with  ca. 0,2 
– 0,4 km. / litres with a 1 USD rise in gasoline price.
24 A study from the UK Department of 
Transport finds a fuel-price elasticity to the new car fuel efficiency of 0.2 %.
25 
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2.3.  HIGHER TAXES LEAD TO GREEN TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS 
Having established that price and tax increases can be highly effective in reducing energy 
demand and pushing demand in the direction of energy efficient variants, we are ready to 
discuss the long run implications for innovation in such technologies. As pointed out above, 
the presence of these behavioural changes is a prerequisite for the existence of a market for 
green innovations. In fact, the more expensive we make fossil fuel inputs, energy consump-
tion, emissions and other forms of pollution, and the larger behavioural responses (demand 
and substitution elasticities), the greater incentives we find for investing in R&D. In other 
words, higher energy prices change the relative returns from longer term investment options 
to the benefit of energy and GHG displacing technologies. 
 
Powerful effect on R&D spending and green technology diffusion 
Studies on the effect of policy or prices on innovation draw their motivation from the notion 
of induced innovation (or directed innovation), which recognises that R&D is a profit-
motivated investment activity and that the direction of innovation likely responds positively 
in the direction of increased prices.
26  Empirical studies on the effect of policy and prices on 
environmental innovation both support the conjectures of the induced innovation hypothe-
sis and provide evidence of the magnitude of these. 
 
One branch of such empirical studies uses simulation models to assess the magnitude of in-
duced innovation.
27 A recent study carried out by the OECD
28 finds that current and future 
expected carbon prices appear to have powerful effects on R&D spending and clean tech-
nology diffusion. The study assumes a global carbon price reflecting the CO2 emission tra-
jectories necessary to keep temperature increases below 2˚ Celsius. Under this scenario new 
technologies will contribute with ca. 50 percent decarbonisation where current rates are ca. 
35 percent. These calculations are based on a detailed description of the energy sector (bot-
tom-up) and the carbon markets combined with a general description of the global economy 
(top-down, CGE). 
 
A second branch applies econometric techniques to historical data and in this way attempts 
to assess the linkage between pollution prices (either in terms of energy input, consumption 
or emission prices) and targeted R&D performance.
29 This is the approach we take in the 
empirical section below. The typical measure of R&D performance is the number (or num-
ber of citations) of patents within a technology class, and the vast majority of studies either 
concern the US or Europe within the last 30-40 years. Early studies used pollution abate-
                                                           
26 Hicks 1932,  Binswanger and Ruttan 1978, Acemoglu 2002 
27 E.g. Popp (2006), Acemoglu et al (2009), Fisher and Newel (2008). 
28 OECD (2009), ”The role of R&D and technology diffusion in climate change mitigation: new perspectives using 
the WITCH model,” Working  Papers No. 664. 
29 E.g., Popp (2002), Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003), Hamamoto (2006), Johnstone et al (2009).   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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ment control expenditures (PACE) to proxy for environmental regulatory stringency since 
environmental taxes have typically been lower than such costs.
30 
 
In fact, recent studies have shown robust effects from energy prices on patenting on energy 
technologies.
31 An important methodological advance in achieving this result concerns the 
use of disaggregated patent counts as it allows targeting the empirical analysis directly on 
relevant energy related patents.
32 The general result from analyses exploiting disaggregated 
patent data is that induced innovation materialises quite clearly in patenting activities. This 
holds for several measures of environmental policies: PACE
33, regulation
34, and energy prices 
(taxes)
35. For example, an increase in compliance expenditures of 1 percent typically lead to 
increases in R&D expenditure of 0.2 percent across countries and industries. This holds for 
any kind of instrument applied: be it taxes, allowances, or command-and-control. The esti-
mate on energy prices is also economically and statistically significant. A one percentage in-
crease in energy prices implies an approx. 0.4 percentage increase in energy technology pat-
enting. The estimations also suggest that non-market policies are less effective; technology 
standards (command-and-control) create fewer patents with less environmental impact.
36 
 
The literature has acknowledged the presence of time lags in induced innovation.
37 There are 
several reasons for time lags. First, firms must wait for clear price signals before they allocate 
resources to R&D – and in the case of energy prices, we typically see significant short run 
volatility blurring the price signal. Second, institutional (within-firm) barriers may cause 
slow adjustment. Along the same lines, research personnel may need some time to adapt to a 
changed focus. Third, patents are created on the basis of an innovation process which in it-
self takes some time. The empirical literature typically comes up with a half-life of induced 
innovation in the ballpark 3-5 years, i.e., half of the induced innovations have occurred 3-5 
years after the price/tax increase.
38 Fourth, patents need to be converted into deployment of 
new technologies before having real effects on energy consumption. 
 
A deeper reading of this literature provides some further insights into the nature and neces-
sary preconditions of innovation impacts. There is unfortunately very little to be said directly 
on how environmental taxes differ in impact from overall prices and/or other instruments. It 
is noteworthy that time and geography seem to influence the level of the impact, but in our 
context it is particularly interesting to look at policy conditions that favour innovation im-
pacts. We find an overview of this in Table 2.3. 
 
                                                           
30 For example Jaffe and Palmer (1997) and Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003). 
31 Popp (2006), Johnstone et al (2009). 
32 Lanjouw and Mody (1996), Popp (2006) 
33 Lanjouw and Mody (1996). 
34 Popp (2006). 
35 Newell et al (1999), Popp (2002), Johnstone et al (2009) (a). 
36 Johnstone et al (2009). 
37 See, e.g., Peeters and Surry (2000). 
38 Johnstone et al (2009) (a), Popp (2010).   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Table 2.3: Factors influencing the innovation impacts 
Factor influencing impact  Effect  Source 
Policies and instruments    
Domestic policies  +  Popp (2006) 
Information to consumers (labelling)  +  Newell et al (1999) 
Geography/economic development    
Developed countries  +  Lanjouw and Moody (1996) 
Developing countries  -  Lanjouw and Moody (1996) 
Time    
Recent years  +  Brunnemeier and Cohen (2003) 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
The table demonstrates how a specific factor, say predictability and stability of policies, in-
fluences the level of induced innovation. A “+” implies that the factor increases the innova-
tion impact from prices and/or policies. Thus, the table conveys that predictable and stable 
policies induce more innovation than more ad-hoc policy solutions. 
 
Note that we have already touched upon the issue of labelling and consumer information 
when discussing elasticities above. In that (much broader) literature it was a standard finding 
that labelling and information increased responsiveness. In the case of induced innovation, 
according to the source references in the table above, domestic policies (a policy category 
used by Popp mainly including information campaigns) and labelling yield the same result. 
As the innovation impacts should work ‘through’ elasticities, it is comforting that we can 
point to some of the same factors. 
 
The table also demonstrates some differences over countries and time. The basic message 
from this part is that the more advanced level of development of the economies (looking 
along both the time and cross country dimension) leads to more responsive patenting – 
probably because general production of innovation is more important and more rent-
seeking. This observation, however, is not very relevant from a policy perspective. 
Technology and innovation decisions have a global scope 
In the above discussion of demand responses and innovation impacts, we have been rather 
vague in our definition of the relevant market. In the following paragraphs, we attempt to 
clarify the role of global markets – both concerning the medium run decisions on technology 
choice and long run decisions on induced innovation. 
 
The decision to change technology by profit seeking firms is based on a cost benefit analysis. 
As shown above, green technologies are typically more expensive up-front, but excel in their 
lower running costs. However, there may be other possibilities than changing technology. 
Firms may simply change location when environmental policies become too rigid in a spe-
cific country. In the worst case, an environmental policy can trigger an outsourcing of energy 
intensive processes to regions with low or no taxes, but deploying highly inefficient tech-
nologies. Thus, global emissions will increase and the policy will be counterproductive.
39 
                                                           
39 There is a long literature on so called carbon leakage. Some of the most interesting references are Babiker (2005), 
Szabo et al(2006), Demailly and Quirion (2006), and Barker et al (2007).   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Leakage will not arise mainly as a competition advantage of countries not participating in 
the emission reductions, but as an input price effect. Lower world demand for fossil fuels 
will lower prices and increase fossil-fuel consumption in these countries. Consumer markets 
and industry processes closest to the end market are less vulnerable. The same goes for prod-
ucts that are costly to transport.
40 
 
There is a mirror image to leakage in production for ‘leakage’ in innovation. The point is 
that for geographically narrow defined taxes there is little incentive to engage in development 
projects that would lead to new technologies cutting these taxes back. Important innovations 
always have a market perspective that is broader than narrow national markets in order to 
repay the research investments. 
 
Formally, innovation has at least two global dimensions.
41 First, innovation exploits global 
opportunities as just outlined. Second, geographically diversified innovation reduces invest-
ment risks. Both dimensions clearly suggest that local taxes will only have limited impact on 
innovation. 
 
A study finds that EU27 is geographically insufficient to avoid carbon leakage for environ-
mentally uncompromising tax policies.
42 Thus, from a European Union point of view, it 
seems natural to mitigate carbon leakage by, at least, including all Member States under the 
allowance trading schemes and unifying current national energy tax schemes. The study 
clearly suggests that policy makers should opt for widest possible coverage – even if the out-
come of the agreements may seem second-best compared to what is attainable. This is not to 
say that European taxes are inefficient, but simply that they are much more efficient if they 
are backed up on the international scene too. That implies as well that global carbon pricing 
has stronger effect on EU innovation than EU carbon pricing alone. 
2.4.  NEW EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON INNOVATION IMPACTS 
 This section is devoted to the empirical analysis using European patent data to investigate 
the relation between price signals and induced innovation. The overall conclusion is that en-
ergy price increases do induce more innovation. However, before turning to this result, we 
will first describe the technologies considered and describe their relevance as energy consum-
ers. After a review of the main results from the empirical model, we will use graphical tools 
to illustrate some important points related to the results and applied methodology. 
                                                           
40 OECD (2008). 
41 Hitt et al (1994). 
42 OECD (2008), see also Bosetti et al (2009b).   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Energy technologies 
A number of technologies exist which in some way relate to energy consumption. Here, we 
choose to look at seven specific technologies:
43 
 
  Biomass for heating in buildings 
  Boilers 
  Ventilation in buildings 
  Lighting 
  Light emitting diodes (LED) 
  Motor vehicle fuel efficiency 
  Paper and pulp production 
 
These are all characterised by a close link between energy consumption and the final output, 
e.g., oil consumed by a boiler to produce heated rooms. However, these technologies also 
possess characteristics distinguishing them from one another. 
 
We expect the different technologies to take different paths in their response to changes in 
energy prices. Cars, biomass in buildings, boilers and ventilation in buildings are characte-
rized by high investment prices for the end-user. The percentage reductions in energy use 
may not be large, but the effect on household budgets could be significant as the cost of 
energy in these products is substantial. Lighting and LED technologies represent a small in-
vestment for the end user, but with very large, percentage-wise, reductions in energy use. 
The energy cost of these products is typically small in terms of household budgets. Finally, 
the paper and pulp industry represents a class of its own, where innovations in energy effi-
ciency lower the cost of producing a product that for the end user is unchanged. 
 
                                                           
43 The exact definition with respect to extraction from the EPO database is described in appendix C.   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Figure 2.9: Energy budget (cost) shares for different processes 
 
Note: For lighting, heating, ventilation, and motor vehicles, we present the budget share of total household energy 
costs. For paper and pulp we present the budget share of total production costs. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics based on IEA, Eurostat, and specific studies 
 
The above differences in the technologies’ properties will imply that the innovation response 
to changes in energy prices will differ among the products. 
 
For biomass, boilers, ventilation and motor vehicles the penetration rate of the energy effi-
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have  a lifespan of 5+ years
44, and that their cost structure suggests that consumer choice of 
technology will be made upon time of replacement. Even though the effect may take time, 
changes in energy prices should have a high effect on consumer choices, as these products 
have a high energy cost as share of the household budget, so energy costs play a relatively 
high role compared to the agents other preferences for the products. 
 
The opposite holds for lightning and LED, partly because they exhibit shorter life spans, 
partly due to the fact that energy costs of these products play a minor part in the household’s 
budget. To a large extent, consumer taste/preferences will be determining for lighting source 
decisions. 
 
The paper and pulp industry’s choice of technology is a long term decision, where choices of 
production methods represent large costs and 10+ year lifespan. As paper and pulp producers 
should aim for profit maximization, their investment in energy efficient technologies will be 
solely driven of their own long term projection of energy prices and the cost of the actual in-
vestment. This suggests that the adaption of energy efficient technology in the paper and 
pulp industry to a high degree will be driven by energy prices, but with a significant time lag. 
Patents, taxes and energy prices 
In this section, we present the results from our econometric investigations on the link be-
tween energy prices, taxes, and patents. Here we focus on the general messages, while a more 
thorough, methodological treatment is given in Appendix A. 
 
Looking across the results from different technologies, we find quite clear patterns, c.f. Table 
2.4. The table demonstrates the sign and statistical significance of estimated coefficients 
across different estimations. Thus, a “+” refers to moderate evidence of a positive relation, 
whereas the double “++” implies highly significant estimates of a positive relation in most of 
the estimations.
45 Similarly, “-“ and “- -“ will denote negative relations, while a “0” indicates 
a lack of statistical significance. For example, for ventilation technologies we see that public 
R&D together with (long run) taxes imply a highly significant positive impact on patenting 
activity. 
 
                                                           
44 Eurostat 
45 There is no mathematical rule for the sign/significance assignment in the table. We start by classifying the regres-
sions as to whether they produce meaningful results or not. Only thereafter, we compare the evidence across the 
remaining specifications.   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Table 2.4: Sign and statistical significance of estimates  
Technology  Public 
R&D 






Lighting +  ++  ++  0  + 
LED  + 0 0 0 0 
Biomass  0 NA  0 ++  ++ 
Boilers  0 NA  - 0 ++ 
Ventilation  ++  0 0 0 ++ 
Motor  vehicles  + NA  0 0 ++ 
Paper and pulp  NA  NA  +  ++  ++ 
Note: Signs represent the statistical size of impact across models. Roughly, a single sign represents cases with a coef-
ficient being weakly significant in a few model estimations, whereas a double sign requires higher signifi-
cance and agreement across estimations. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
We complement this table with estimates from the estimation we prefer the most for each 
technology, c.f. Table 2.5. However, due to econometric issues, we are reluctant to put too 
much emphasis on a single specification and instead prefer to look at general patterns across 
estimations. One should therefore also be very careful when comparing the two tables. There 
are two specific caveats. 
 
One specific caveat is that the tax estimates comes on top of their implicit price impacts. 
Thus, if the price effect is significant, then the tax is also significant by default, but may have 
an additional effect which is tested by the specific tax coefficient. Thus, in Table 2.4 we can 
characterise, say, the long run tax impact as highly positive (“++”) despite the additional tax 
effect being slightly negative as long as the total long run price estimate is positive and sig-
nificant.  
 
The other caveat concerns the difference between short and long run effects. A short run ef-
fect is estimated directly as a parameter in the econometric specification, while the long run 
effect must be calculated based on the dynamic structure of the specification. For example, if 
the model is given by 
 
                                          
 
then the short run effect is given by β, i.e., the immediate impact from last year’s tax in-
crease, while the long run effect will be calculated as β/(1-α), i.e., the accumulated effect over 
a number of years (approximated by the infinite horizon).   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Table 2.5: Selected coefficient estimates 












Lighting -0.163  0.251***  0.425** -0.163  -0.579  1.526*  0.496 
LED 0.062  -0.041  NA  0.493  -0.636  -0.174  0.416 
Biomass -0.020  NA  0.555 0.719*** 0.283**  -1.168  1.074 
Boilers 0.000  NA  -0.348  -0.140  0.227  0.951***  2.332*** 
Ventilation 0.130*** 0.111  -0.336  -0.314 -0.531 0.718  2.369*** 
Motor  vehicles  0.046  NA NA 0.392  0.081  1.110  2.192** 
Paper and pulp  NA  NA  0.165  0.188 0.467***  -0.851  -0.288 
Note: * implies significance at the 10 pct level, ** at the 5 pct level, and *** at the 1 pct level 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
From the above tables there seems to be three main messages. First, environmental taxes 
have much stronger and more lasting effects on patenting than short run price movements. 
This is evident from comparing the last two columns of Table 2.4. We attribute the credibil-
ity and transparency of taxes compared to the volatility of energy prices to this difference.
46  
Second, public ‘institutions’ (such as public R&D and legislation) surrounding the private 
innovation environments do contribute positively to patenting. This is evident from looking 
at the first two columns. Third, technologies such as lighting and LED with small energy 
budget shares do not seem to experience much price/tax induced innovation. This is the 
message from the first two rows of the table. 
 
The first observation concerning the role of taxes for innovation leads to the question of the 
economic importance, i.e., to the size of the coefficient estimates. We illustrate the sizes of 
short and long run impacts in Figure 2.11. 
 
For the majority of industries, we observe a much higher impact from taxes than from prices. 
Long run elasticities are in the range 2-2.5, c.f. Figure 2.10, which is approximately five 
times larger than the estimated price impacts, see Figure 2.11 below. In both cases, one 
should not forget that we have focussed on significant – and thereby typically the largest - es-
timates, but still we believe that there is strong evidence of very significant impacts. 
 
 
                                                           
46 In our data set, the tax variable is approximately 40-60 percent less volatile measured by (comparable) standard 
errors.   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Figure 2.10: Innovation impacts from environmental taxes, significant estimates 
Note: The significance criteria are consistent with the sign criteria in the previous table. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
There are two sectors where the prices (including taxes) turn out to be significant drivers of 
innovation; biomass in buildings and the paper and pulp industry. In both cases, the elastic-
ity estimates of around 0.4 are very much in line with the results from the rest of the litera-
ture (in the previous section we also reported 0.4 as the average estimate). Again, this implies 
that a 1 percent increase in energy prices leads to a 0.4 percent increase in patents. The esti-
mates on biomass in buildings are characterised by a high short run impact and a more mod-
erate long run impact (the latter being more in line with the literature.) However, the stan-
dard error attached to the short run estimate is much higher, so the more plausible ranking 
of low short run and high long run is still within reasonable confidence intervals. It seems 
natural that the effect in the paper and pulp industry comes directly from prices as environ-
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Figure 2.11: Innovation impacts from energy prices, significant estimates 
Note: The significance criteria are consistent with the sign criteria in the previous table. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
The fact that innovation responds considerably more to taxes than to prices may have several 
explanations. The first explanation concerns the stability and credibility of taxes (we will also 
return to this point later when we discuss policy mix in chapter 4). Tax rates are imple-
mented with long horizons and are seldom reset to lower levels. Thus, they send an unambi-
guous signal to innovators that prices will remain at higher levels. In contrast, price changes 
may be caused by short run expectations, economic upturns etc. which does not provide 
long term incentives for R&D investments. 
 
Other types of explanations concern the econometric methodology and statistical behaviour, 
i.e. they imply that estimations contain some bias. The econometric methodology works un-
der functional form approximations, c.f. the discussion in the appendix. These approxima-
tions may cause some bias – especially for fuels where taxes form a relatively large part of end 
user costs, e.g., gasoline for motor vehicles. Moreover, the fact that tax rates change rather 
infrequently and typically in a unidirectional way suggests an easier identification of long 
run impacts for the class of estimators. Energy price movements are frequent and not unidi-
rectional thereby giving rise to much short term noise easily influencing the econometric es-
timates. Note that this latter explanation implies that price elasticities are estimated with a 
negative bias (they are too low compared to true effects), rather than tax estimates being too 
high. 
 
Looking at the above results from a slightly different perspective, we have three different 
classes of estimates/technologies. For lighting and LED technologies, we do not find evi-
dence of the induced innovation hypothesis; neither from prices nor from taxes. In a second 
class, we find typical consumer good technologies (boilers, ventilation, and motor vehicles) 
where price signals play a minor role compared to tax counterparts. Estimates are both eco-
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pulp technologies follow the induced innovation hypothesis directly from prices although at 
somewhat lower response estimates. A priori, we would assume that the biomass in buildings 
belonged to the second class (together with the related technologies boilers and ventilation), 
but this was not confirmed by the estimations. 
 
A second output of the estimations relates the time lags in the induced innovation hypothe-
sis, c.f. the discussion above. Typical estimates of half lives were 3-5 years, where a half life is 
the time it takes from the price/tax signal to half of the induced patents to be filed. Thus, the 
first half of patents appears within 3-5 years, while the other half takes longer to materialise. 
Overall, we confirm this range despite most technologies falling in the lower end of this 
range, c.f. Figure 2.12.
47 Common for both our estimates and those found in the literature is 
a large uncertainty attached to the estimates. The primary cause for this uncertainty is related 
to the methodological approach where the parameters capturing the dynamics of patenting 
almost completely govern the half life estimate. Despite the considerable uncertainty, we still 
believe that the estimate seems economically reasonable and intuitive. 
 
Figure 2.12: Half life estimates 
Note: Half times are based on lag structure and estimated dynamic multipliers. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
Graphical inspection of patent data and relationship between innovation and prices 
In this section we take a less sophisticated look at the data. Specifically, we use graphical 
techniques to investigate patents and energy prices and taxes. Due to the amount of data (30 
years, 30 countries, 13 energy products, and 7 technologies) we focus on a few (more or less 
randomly) selected examples. 
                                                           
47 We have included half life estimates for lighting and LED even though the induced innovation hypothesis was 










years  Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
  36
 
The specific purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a flavour of the underlying 
relations between prices and patents and to introduce some of the econometric issues in the 
empirical analysis. Anticipating the conclusions from the latter issue, i.e., what a good em-
pirical model will need to capture, we can state the main elements as follows: 
 
  Dynamic effects of patents. We show that a change in patenting activity created 
dynamic reactions several years after the initial change. 
  Common trends unrelated to energy prices. A significant portion of the trend 
throughout time seems to relate to changes in industry structure, developments of 
global markets, etc. 
  Country differences. Specifically, the model needs to account for the fact that large 
countries produce more patents than small countries. 
  Fuel / energy source. Several technologies can draw on different energy sources and 
we need the right match between patents and energy price. 
  Taxes are (sometimes) relevant as a separate component. We identified some cases 
where taxes constitute a large proportion of the end user price. 
 
In the paragraphs below, we will demonstrate why we derived these conclusions. We will not 
go into further technical details of the applied methodology here, and we refer the interested 
reader to Appendix A. 
 
Patents 
We choose to let the number of patents within a certain technology class be a measure of in-
novation. It is undisputed that a substantial part of private R&D is made with the purpose 
of issuing patents and subsequently earning economic rents on these patents. As such, the 
measure should be a valid indicator of private R&D output. In the literature, patents are 
clearly also the favoured measure of innovation, cf. our discussion above on innovation im-
pacts. Yet, the literature also points to drawbacks and limitations of this measure. In the fol-
lowing, we sum up the most important criticisms: 
 
  Patents are specific to some physical aspect of the world, not to working or organ-
isational processes. In this way, we do not capture many relevant progresses in, say, 
the organisation of industrial production processes. 
  Patents may differ quite a lot in their quality/relevance. A good patent can contain 
more ‘innovation’ than hundreds of inferior patents.
48 
  Important innovations may never be patented. Rather, the inventor may want to 
keep his invention secret or exploit the commercial value without a protecting pat-
ent for various reasons.
49 
 
                                                           
48 Popp (2006). 
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Leaving aside these concerns, we can take a look at patent characteristics. Within energy-
related technology groups, patenting is most substantial for buildings and energy generation, 
c.f. Figure 2.13. We also observe that carbon storage together with paper making technolo-
gies seem to trend in slightly different ways than the other technology classes. Note that we 
do not consider any technologies within carbon storage in the econometric work. 
 
Figure 2.13: Number of patents across technology classes, OECD countries 
Note:  The vertical axis measures the total number of patents 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics based on EPO 
 
To obtain an impression of the development at country level, we illustrate the level of pat-
enting across selected countries in Figure 2.14. We see that countries have quite different 
levels of patenting, e.g., Japan is a clear outlier due to formal reasons in the patenting system. 
However, also European countries show differences which are not merely related to the size 
of the economies. For example, Finland and Sweden produce marginally more patents than 
larger countries such as Italy and Spain. Thus, the suggested panel data approach controlling 
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Figure 2.14: Patents across countries  
Note:  The vertical axis measures the total number of patents 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics based on EPO 
 
An interesting characteristic about patents concerns their dynamic behaviour. There are 
good economic reasons why patenting in one year is closely related to patenting in the previ-
ous year. First, company level choices of investing in R&D are hardly ever a year by year dis-
crete choice. Instead, money flows to R&D departments often have longer horizons which 
create dependence between years not only on the input side, but also on the output side. 
Second, patents will often feed into new patents within the same class. When researchers 
come up with important technical advances, these will spread out to all related fields in the 
next years. 
 
In Figure 2.15 we demonstrate the dynamic patterns. The figure shows the patenting activity 
for six EU Member States year by year as the relative activity compared to the country’s av-
erage activity over the entire 30 years. (That is, a value of 10 percent in a given year tells us 
that patenting was 10 percent above the country’s average patenting level.) In this way, series 
that seldom cross the 0-line display significant dynamics; a high level in one period carries 
over to the next period and similarly for low levels.
50 The figure clearly demonstrates that 
there are rather few intersections over time. Furthermore, the figure demonstrates a signifi-
cant increase in volatility around 2002. One possible explanation is the political attention 
devoted to energy efficiency and bans of light bulbs over this period starting with Directive 
2002/91/EC. This may have triggered some patenting; both patents that were simply wait-
ing for the right moment to apply and patents following up on specific legal requirements. 
To the extent that on-the-shelf patents were issued, this would explain much of the volatility 
increase. 
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Figure 2.15: Patenting dynamics for six EU MS, 1978-2007, lighting technologies 
Note: The figure shows the number of patents relative to the country average over time. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics based on EPO 
 
Patents, energy prices and taxes 
The purpose of the econometric study is to test the impact from energy prices (and taxes) on 
patenting activity within various technology classes. In this section, we take a short look at 
this relation. In Figure 2.16 we see the development in transportation patents for four se-
lected countries (all being motor vehicle producers) together with oil prices. We see that pat-
ents often, though not always, covariate with prices.  
 
In particular, it is interesting to observe the differences in behaviour around the second oil 
crisis (1979-1980). For all four countries we see a clear upward trend in oil prices, with  the 
high price remaining a few years into the 1980s. When it comes to patenting, however, 
German car producers hardly show any response to the new situation, whereas Japanese car 
manufacturers seem to respond quite fast. (UK and France do moderately increase patents 
for a short period.) The most straightforward interpretation of this difference relates to the 
different market segments. To put it bluntly, German cars were aiming at customers looking 
for comfort and robustness, while Japanese cars were sold to customers focusing on the 
price-quality dimension. Hence, Japanese car producers had to respond to higher gasoline 
prices to offer a cost-efficient product. Obviously, there may be several other factors explain-
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Figure 2.16: Refined oil end user prices and patenting in motor vehicles, four large car-
producers 
 
Note: The left vertical axis displays dollar prices of oil. The right vertical axis displays the number of patents. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics based on EPO and IEA data. 
 
The car example can also demonstrate two other important points complicating the analysis 
between prices and innovation. The first point concerns the composition of patents. Even in 
the German case without much overall response to the second oil price crisis, there could 
still be a significant change in the number of patents directly related to fuel cost savings at 
the cost of other patents. We simply do not know.
51 The second point is related to the choice 
of fuel price. In the figures above, we plot patenting activity against the price of oil , but cars 
consume gasoline or automotive diesel, not crude oil. And in the case of gasoline, the stan-
dard type has changed from leaded to unleaded over the period of interest. The choice of the 
relevant fuel becomes particularly relevant when taxes start playing a more pronounced role. 
 
Turning to another example, we can look at the paper and pulp industry where the energy 
costs are incurred during the production of the goods, not during deployment. Figure 2.17 
provides a simple cross-plot of patents and the relevant industry electricity price. Obviously, 
such a simple representation must not be taken as evidence for a strong positive relation be-
tween prices and innovation. Yet, it does provide a first impression of the basic correlation to 
be more precisely determined in the econometric analysis. 
 
Moreover, Figure 2.17 demonstrates some of the challenges in working with a panel consist-
ing of both a country and a time dimension. The figure “identifies” two paths in patenting: 
One path which clearly responds to underlying prices and another which is completely im-
                                                           
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































oil price transportation patents  Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
  41
mune to price changes. A good econometric model will need to control for these two paths 
(much is already done by introducing country fixed effects thereby measuring characteristics 
such is size and industry starting point.) 
 
Figure 2.17: Electricity prices and patenting in the paper and pulp industry 
Note: The figure is based on yearly data points for all countries in the sample. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics based on EPO and IEA statistics 
 
Finally, in specifically assessing the relationship between innovation and taxes, one must first 
ask for the historical importance of taxes. As shown in Figure 2.18, taxes have played a mi-
nor role for most energy products, except gasoline and automotive diesel. In other cases, it is 
questionable how much taxes can contribute to the trends in patenting. However, the figure 
hides the fact that the data may contain significant cross-country and time series variation 
even when the average level is low. Furthermore, as explained elsewhere in this report, there 
are good reasons why tax changes may create larger innovation effects than similar price 
changes (due to non-tax changes.) In fact, part of the estimation strategy is to estimate both 
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Figure 2.18: Tax shares for different fuels, OECD averages 1978-2007 
Note: The tax share is calculated as the $ amount of taxes relative to the final end user price (in  $). Averages are 
simple, not weighted. 
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The previous chapter substantiated that energy and CO2 taxes are likely to have considerable 
effects on the innovation of energy technologies; nevertheless more direct public support for 
climate friendly technologies is also needed. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 3.1 describes the individual tasks 
to be fulfilled by taxation on the one hand and R&D support on the other, i.e., what is the 
division of labour? The second section 3.2 then takes a closer look at the interaction between 
the two instruments. That is, we address the question: to what extent in particular are the 
benefits of energy related public RD support depending on the tax environment? The third 
section 3.3 reviews how the mix between tax and R&D depends on the stringency and time 
horizon of policy ambitions. Finally, the fourth section 3.4 reviews some empirical studies 
on optimal policy mix between energy taxes and RD policies in delivering on global climate 
policy objectives. 
 
Throughout the chapter we will repeatedly draw on results from a simple simulation model, 
the CERIM (Copenhagen Economics Renewables Innovation Model) in order to illustrate 
important points. An introduction to the CERIM is given in Box 3.1 below, while a formal 
model description can be found in Appendix B. 
3.1.  DIFFERENT ROLES FOR DIFFERENT INSTRUMENTS 
In this section we address the different roles economic theory attaches to environmental 
taxation and R&D support. We will focus on the following four issues: 
 
  The dual  externality problem 
  The long term credibility problem 
  R&D support and crowding out 
  The effect on innovation played by non market-based mechanisms 
Chapter 3  CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF TAXATION VIS-A-VIS DIRECT
INNOVATION POLICIES   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Box 3.1. Introduction to the CERIM 
Copenhagen Economics Renewables Innovation Model is based on the formulation in Fisher and Newell 
(2008). The focus is on the US electricity sector, and the model divides production in four technologies: nu-
clear, coal, natural gas, and renewables. Since the establishment of nuclear plants is more closely linked to 
political processes than market signals (and since it is non-emitting), we assume an exogenous path for 
this technology. The model contains two periods each containing several years. The first period starts from 
the current situation (parameter estimates from around 2008) and covers n1 years while the second period 
starts immediately after (and contains n2 years.) 
 
The renewable sector has the potential for technological advance depending on how much resources are al-
located to R&D in the first period. The benefits, in terms of lower renewable production costs, are reaped in 
the second period. The policy maker has two instruments at his disposal: a carbon emission tax and an R&D 
subsidy. In this way, he can influence the production and emission path of the electricity sector by setting 
taxes and subsidies in both the current and in the future period. 
 
The model is based on firm profit maximisation and consumer utility maximisation. The outputs of the 
models are multiple: carbon emissions, renewable shares, welfare, etc. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
The double externality problem 
Up to this point, we have only addressed the problem of missing prices for pollution. As 
should be clear by now, environmental taxes will – at least partially – be able to solve this 
problem.  
 
But when it comes to innovations of green technologies there is an additional problem. A 
new innovation may create positive spillovers to other firms and the rest of the economy 
since innovations can be improved, standardized and create the basis for new technology 
classes. But these positive effects, which may exceed the direct profit creating effects to the 
company by several factors, are not fully appropriated by the company financing the re-
search. Thus, the investments in company R&D are not sufficient when compared to the 
societal gains they create. In other words, we again see a missing price (payment in this case) 
for the effects created by an economic activity, R&D
52. 
 
Below, in Figure 3.1, we illustrate the double externality problem graphically. In the left 
panel, we see the environmental externality as a difference between social and private mar-
ginal cost curves (SMC and PMC respectively) – social marginal costs include the cost of 
climate change and other pollution damages and are therefore higher. A good environmental 
tax would add to private marginal costs so that these become exactly aligned with the social 
counterpart. That is, the tax should equal the vertical distance between the two cost curves; 
this distance is denoted by ‘A’ leading also to a reduction in emissions. 
 
                                                           
52 “All private sector innovation suffers from market failures.  These are even more acute in the case of climate 
change, as environmental market failures compound the problem.  Thus, policy plays a key role in  shaping both 
the direction and magnitude of climate-friendly technological change”, Popp (2010).   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Figure 3.1: Representation of double externality problem 













Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
The right panel illustrates the knowledge spillovers in the market for research. We assume as 
standard that return for research in energy research shows declining returns, hence a falling 
demand curve, while costs of supplying (quality adjusted) research is increasing, hence an 
upward sloping supply curve. Here, it is the private value of R&D which is below the socie-
tal value, since private companies do not care about the positive spill over effects from R&D.  
This means that the private demand (PMU) lies below the societal optimal demand (SMU). 
Now, given that we impose a tax on pollution, we will raise the private value of innovation 
in pollution-reducing technologies, and we illustrate this shift with the dashed line in the 
middle of the panel. The upward shift in demand for research amounts to the distance de-
noted ‘B’ in the figure. However, there is still a research spill-over failure. This can be ad-
dressed by an R&D subsidy (of some sort) that increases the demand for research corre-
sponding to the distance C leading to a further increase in R&D corresponding to this dis-
tance. 
 
From a policy perspective, the main question concerns the mix between environmental taxes 
that internalise the environmental externality and public funding / subsidies of R&D inter-
nalising the innovation spillovers. It is clear from the previous discussion that in a first best 
world each externality requires its own instrument. 
 
Economics literature provides two main conclusions in this respect. First, if the economy is 
in equilibrium, the tax and support instruments should be directly targeted to the corre-  Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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sponding externality, c.f. the discussion above. Second, if the knowledge stock on environ-
mentally friendly technologies is too low (i.e. there is disequilibrium), then both instruments 
could be used more aggressively than simply by addressing the equilibrium externalities. Ad-
aptation of new policies that dramatically changes relative prices in the economy – i.e. price 
of carbon – is a clear example of how the stock of knowledge capital in a sector can change 
from being in equilibrium in view of the old policy stance and become far too low relative to 
future needs with new policy stance. Below, we discuss each of these arguments in turn. 
 
Starting with the argument focussing on equilibrium externality effects, we find that policies 
to address knowledge spillovers are more effective if they address all knowledge spillovers, 
rather than focusing exclusively on R&D pertaining to alternative energy.
53 Similarly, the lit-
erature suggests that environmental taxes should directly target what they are meant for – the 
externality.
54 Not surprisingly, technology subsidies alone have a smaller environmental im-
pact than policies that directly address the environmental externality. 
 
Yet, one can play with the idea of setting a high energy tax to attain both objectives.
55 If the 
tax is sufficiently high, one could induce the level of innovations in green technologies that 
are optimal from a societal point of view. This corresponds to setting a high tax that shifts 
the dashed line in the right panel of Figure 3.1 sufficiently to reach the line for societal op-
timal demand. However, the tax will necessarily be distorting. First, it will over-internalise 
the environmental externality and therefore distort consumption choices. Second, it will in-
duce innovations in green technologies only, and will therefore not solve the general knowl-
edge spill-over externality that exists for all types of R&D. In fact, the studies playing with 
this idea come to the conclusion that it is in-optimal from an environmental point of view.
56  
 
Turning to the case where we assume a current disequilibrium in the knowledge stock or 
similar, the previous conclusion will be challenged. For example, we can imagine that the 
green technologies R&D stock has been neglected for decades (say due to missing price sig-
nals) such that the additional societal value of R&D in these technologies largely exceeds 
that of other technologies.
57 In such cases, we need a push in green technology innovations. 
It is therefore argued that environmental taxes may play a role in achieving this. 
 
                                                           
53 Schneider and Goulder (1997). 
54 Popp et al (2009). 
55 Popp (2006), Hart (2008). A secondary argument relates to the use of revenues from taxes on energy and carbon.  
Potentially, the labour distortions resulting from energy taxes may be lower than income taxes. Hence a switch from 
energy taxes to income taxes may improve labour market functioning. However, this argument is tricky: energy 
taxes may have less of an impact on labour market because energy demand is less income elastic than other con-
sumer goods and hence have a lower impact on marginal tax rates than for example VAT. But that is reflected by 
definition in a redistribution of net income from low to high income families. In effect any policy that accepts such 
a redistribution can be used to finance lower marginal tax rates. For this and other reason, the very extensive 
Mirrlees review (2010) undertaken by the Institute of Fiscal Studies,UK, was very sceptical about using labour mar-
ket arguments for raising energy or other environmental taxes. 
56 Hart (2008), Popp (2006), Greaker and Pade (2008). 
57 See Acemoglu et al (2009) for an example of this argument.   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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A similar argument is based on rising societal cost of emissions (i.e., temperature increases 
become more and more expensive to deal with.)
58 In this case, the spillovers from emissions-
savings knowledge will again be more valuable than spillovers from other innovations, justi-
fying a temporary increase in the optimal emissions tax as well as R&D support to account 
for differences in the social benefits of spillovers across technologies.
59 
 
Another type of exception – still arising from economic disequilibria – is if patent policy is 
weak. Then additional environmental taxes are justified as a second-best policy for address-
ing the knowledge market spill-over.
60 Still, we emphasise that the solution is second-best, 
especially as we would distort innovations towards green technologies (now assuming that 
this is not necessary.) 
 
Thus, our reading of the literature on solving the double externality problem suggests that 
both an environmental tax and R&D support is the only way of adequately addressing the 
problem. 
The long term credibility problem 
R&D is a risky investment that, when yielding new profit opportunities for private compa-
nies, will pay off in a distant future. Cost-benefit analyses of various research projects must 
therefore include the risk that pollution prices are not predictable far in the future.
61 Since 
many research projects in green technologies can move from the green to the red zone for 
small variations in, say, emission prices, it is extremely important that long term tax policies 
are well-defined, credible, and demonstrate a high degree of continuity over time. 
 
The literature has recognised that it is the expectations of future policies that motivate 
R&D, and that emission caps put in place before innovations resulting from R&D can be 
deployed have no effect as incentives.
62 Indeed, the literature emphasises the ‘announcement 
effect’ of future carbon limits.
63 
 
In the case of emissions prices, studies point to the large uncertainty attached to future 
commitments and allocation of allowances.
64 The literature suggests that high volatility in 
prices of CO2 considerably reduce willingness to make early investments in low carbon 
power generation and carbon and capture storage (CCS) technologies.
65 Such volatility sig-
nificantly increases investment risk and cost of capital which makes it profitable to postpone 
investments. So CO2 price volatility may hamper the investments that climate policy is at-
tempting to encourage. Uncertainty in climate policy contributes to volatile CO2 prices and 
                                                           
58 See, e.g., Fankhauser (1993). 
59 Hart (2008). 
60 Greaker and Pade (2008). 
61 Baker and Adu-Bonnah (2008).  
62 Yang et al (2008). 
63 Montgomery (1972), Montgomery and Smith(2007). 
64 DEFRA (2008). 
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therefore long-term policy certainty is vital to minimise investment risks in low carbon tech-
nologies.   
 
The example of carbon prices, therefore, fits quite well with the notion of dynamic inconsis-
tency.
66 Carbon prices will need to be high to create additional R&D investment possibili-
ties, but even if the policy makers announce future emission levels that create such an incen-
tive, the government will prefer reneging on this level once the technology is developed.  
 
To sum up, when policy makers opt for more aggressive environmental taxes, it is of utter 
importance that these policies are credible and communicated in a convincing way. Any le-
gal manoeuvre that will bind future policy makers to stringent carbon taxing will be good for 
current R&D investments. 
R&D crowding out 
Crowding out of R&D is an issue when we attempt to emphasise innovations of green tech-
nology, irrespective of our instruments. It is therefore related to the discussion of using taxes 
to equilibrate imbalances in the current state of the economy. Thus, if we assume a current 
disequilibrium in research efforts of energy technologies, the entire discussion of crowding 
out becomes much less important: one unit of more research in energy technology has a 
higher value to a society than 1 unit of research in other fields of research. In the relevant 
case of targeting R&D support in an economy with no knowledge stock imbalances, the ba-
sic message from this subsection is that R&D externalities from all technology branches 
should be equilibrated. 
 
We should note two things from the beginning of this discussion. First, we note that R&D 
crowding out is unavoidable in reaching the goal of more research in green technologies – 
human and physical resources must be drawn from somewhere in the economy. Yet, in the 
typical understanding of the word, crowding out specifically refers to a reduction of research 
(spending, employment, patents, or similar) in another technology branch to substitute the 
increased research in green technologies. Second, we note that both higher taxes as well as 
larger targeted R&D subsidies lead to crowding out.  
 
However, while the two instruments are formally equivalent, there exists an important dif-
ference in the labour market distortions created by each instrument. Where taxes will help 
collect revenue that can be recycled to neutralise any adverse effect on labour supply, R&D 
subsidies will have the opposite effect since gathering of tax revenue is a prerequisite for 
funding expenditure. So gains from spillovers must exceed tax induced distortions from RD 
funding. 
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In addition, our reading of the empirical literature on induced innovation tells us that 
crowding out seems to exist.
 67 Impacts on aggregate R&D expenditures and patenting are 
much smaller than for specific, smaller technology classes. Thus, there seems to be smaller, if 
any, effects on total innovation stock, so the effects obtained at disaggregated level must 
stem from reallocation of R&D efforts.
68 
Command-and-control systems and innovation 
In this section we address the sufficiency of market based systems. That is, we ask if envi-
ronmental taxes and R&D subsidies need to be complemented by command-and-control 
policies to boost innovation. We have already touched upon the question in section 2.1 
above stating that campaigns together with information and technology standards seem to 
create larger consumer responses (thereby creating more innovation.) 
 
Evidence on the efficacy of command-and-control mechanisms is mixed as regards effect on 
innovation. Some studies point to the basic problem that there is no incentive to innovate 
beyond the current technology standard.
69 Also, command-and-control is typically designed 
to punish underperformers, while over-performers – those being ahead of the standard – are 
not rewarded. Other studies, which look directly at patents related to a specific technology 
standard, find quite impressive innovation effects.
70 Thus, command-and-control may under 
certain circumstances be efficient in reaching medium run climate targets while they do not 
seem to provide long run solutions. Critics of pure market-based systems also see a role for 
command-and-control mechanisms in introducing close-to-market technologies that would 
see long lead times due to uncertainties.
71 
 
Summing up, market-based mechanisms are likely to solve most of the double externality 
problem as long as the technologies of interest are not too costly and risky. Publicly funded 
research must step in to assure that the entire research portfolio is sufficiently diversified to 
reach the climate targets. 
3.2.  THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TAXATION AND R&D SUPPORT 
Given that taxation and R&D have different roles in promoting environmental friendly in-
novation, we must consider how they interact under certain circumstances. We focus the 
discussion on the following two issues: 
 
  Innovation and rebound effects 
  The proper timing of support and taxation 
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The discussion below examines these two points. 
Support for green technologies, their deployment and rebound effects 
Any policy boosting technological advance in a particular area will drive consumer demand 
in this direction. If we support technologies that lower the costs of using energy, then con-
sumers will respond by increasing the level of the energy consuming activity, c.f. the above 
discussion on energy price elasticity. This is the so called rebound effect. A study measuring 
the rebound effect from fuel efficiency innovations finds that 60 percent of the improve-
ments is lost again due to the rebound effect.
72 This estimate seems to represent similar stud-
ies quite well, c.f. Table 3.1. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Overview of studies of rebound effects 
Author/Date  Region  Efficiency improvements  Estimated rebound effect 
Semboja, 1994  Kenya  Improvements in both production 
and consumption sectors 
>100% in both cases 
Dufournaud et al, 1994  Sudan  100-200%  improvement  in  effi-
ciency of in heating stoves 
47-77% 
Vikstrom, 2003  Sweden  15% in production sectors and 12% 






1% all sectors 
 
53% in base case 
 
Grepperud & Rasmussen, 2004  Norway  Doubling of historical growth rate of 
electricity productivity for four sec-
tors, and doubling of growth rate of 
oil efficiency for two sectors 
Small for oil but >100% in some 
cases for electricity 
Glomsrod &Taoyuan, 2005  China  Deregulation of coal cleaning indus-
try, lowering price and increasing 
supply of clean coal 
>100% 
Hanley et al, 2005  Scotland  5% for producers (including energy 
supply) 
>100% 
Allan et al, 2006  UK  5% for producers (including energy 
supply) 
37% in base case 
Frondel et al, 2007  Germany  Historical  fuel  efficiency  improve-
ments in the transport sector 
57-67% 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics based on Allan et al. (2007) 
 
In this respect, it is important to make a distinction between “dirty” and “clean” technolo-
gies.
73 If we promote zero carbon technologies, rebound is not so problematic (apart from 
energy efficiency goals), while support for, e.g., clean coal or new diesel engine design is 
more problematic. When we promote the latter type of innovations, then we need at the 
same time to ensure that economic incentives intended to save CO2 are set sufficiently high. 
We need to see this as a complementary policy design where taxes are raised and R&D pro-
jects with high spill-over effects are supported at the same time. 
 
Moreover, with end-of-pipe technology focusing on removing/reducing the polluting quan-
tity, while leaving the basic service unchanged, taxation/carbon pricing is required for any 
deployment to take place. Within the area of energy, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
technologies are a clear example. They will add substantially to the costs of producing energy 
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while producing the same good, namely electricity. Thus even huge amounts of subsidies for 
development of CCS will come to nothing if CO2 is not priced. To put this concisely: re-
search may take place, but there is no diffusion into the economy due to lacking incentives. 
At the other end of the spectrum, support for innovation in energy efficiency, lowering the 
costs of energy efficient products will have inherent value to consumers, thus leading to 
more deployment of these products even in the absence of carbon pricing. This brings us 
back to the discussion of the rebound effects stated above. 
 
Thus, support of innovation in both “dirty” and end-of-pipe technologies clearly requires 
taxation/carbon pricing to put a price on emissions. 
Timing of R&D support and taxation 
In this subsection, we look at issues related to timing of tax rates and R&D subsidies. The 
basic insight goes as follows: assuming that R&D subsidies today can induce technologies 
that lower abatement costs in the future, then it will be societal optimal to have a rising tax 
profile.
74 To understand this argumentation, we must first recall that CO2 pollution is basi-
cally a stock, we can add to over time, for example over the two time periods: “today” and 
“tomorrow”. When additional CO2 cannot exceed a certain level after tomorrow, then the 
question arises of how to divide emissions between now and tomorrow. And it is obviously 
better to abate more, when abatement costs are lowest. Thus, a rising tax profile will ac-
commodate an intelligent division between abatement today and tomorrow given that inno-
vation actually lowers tomorrow’s abatement costs. 
 
This insight can easily be demonstrated by simulations with CERIM. The model can show 
the necessary carbon taxes to achieve a certain emission target, say a 10 percent reduction 
over a 20 year period. Maximising social welfare (in the US electricity industry) will suggest 
a rising tax profile over the model’s two base periods as shown in 3.2. The figure shows the 
tax related consumer welfare losses for a base year on both periods of the model.
75 Moreover, 
the figure does so for both a constant tax scheme (top) and the optimal rising tax scheme 
(bottom). Take the case of the constant tax scheme. Without the tax, the electricity market 
price would have been 81.8 $/MWh, while the after-tax price (including equilibrium effects) 
becomes 87.3 $/MWh. This corresponds to a welfare loss (Harberger triangle) of $ 173 mill. 
In a second period year, this will be only 128 $/MWh thanks to the progress in renewables. 
If there are equally as many years in both periods (and no discounting), we can calculate the 
welfare loss as the simple sum of welfare losses amounting to 301 mil $. In contrast, imple-
menting the optimal rising tax scheme (bottom of figure) yields a welfare loss of just $ 220 
mill. 
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Figure 3.2: Welfare loss for constant and rising tax rates when achieving a 10 percent 
reduction in CO2 emissions, CERIM simulations 
Note: The tax profile is calculated as the endogenous carbon price in a version of the CERIM with fixed total emis-
sions corresponding to a 20 percent reduction and maximised welfare. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
However, the reverse profile is called for when learning costs are substantial.
76 In that case, it 
is better to start abating today, since time is of the essence. Hence, there is a central differ-
ence in appropriate policies depending on the nature of technological progress. Classical in-
novations require a rising tax profile, while learning-by-doing implies a decreasing profile.  
 
It therefore becomes a central question to estimate the size of learning effects. The tradi-
tional “learning literature provides estimates in the range 5 to 20 percent a year.
77 In Figure 
3.2 we demonstrate the difference in break-even allowance prices for a hypothetical technol-
ogy close to the market, when learning effects are 5 and 20 percent pro annum respectively. 
Clearly, there is a substantial difference between the two extreme cases, since technologies 
can double their efficiency within just a few years in the case of 20 percent, while the same 
improvement takes around 15 years in the other case.  
 
Overall, our reading of the literature suggests that learning rates should be in the lower end 
of the scale. Once, it is recognised that actual technological progress for any given product is 
affected by both past investments in R&D and past deployment (“learning”), estimates of 
learning tends to be at the low end often with gains from R&D being dominant. Further-
more, “learning” is not for free: increased innovation in any particular technology tends to 
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crowd out partially other advances of technology in the section on that subject. In short, a 
lot of caution is required when putting forward learning costs as an argument for early de-
ployment. In Box 3.2 we provide a further discussion of learning effects and estimates 
thereof.  
 
Figure 3.2: Development of break-even prices for different learning effects 
 
Note: The figure shows the development in the lowest possible allowance price that would facilitate introduction of 
a certain technology experiencing learning effects. 
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Box 3.2: Learning effect estimates 
Source: Popp et al (2009) 
3.3.  TIME HORIZON AND STRINGENCY OF POLICY TARGETS 
In this paragraph we discuss how time horizon and stringency of policy targets influence the 
mixing of instruments. The basic insight here is that in the case of ambitious policies in a 
near future, we definitely need both taxation and R&D support. Less ambitious targets in a 
more distant future would mean that gradual improvements are sufficient and taxation itself 
will do a reasonably good job. 
 
Time horizon 
A good way of shaping the discussion is to step back for a moment and consider Figure 3.3. 
The figure shows a standard innovation cycle from the initiation of R&D to final products 
that are sufficiently economical to penetrate the relevant market. The figure starts with the 
idea stage, leading approximately up to the patenting point, where researchers develop con-
ceptual descriptions of new green technologies. We recall from the previous section that 
Typically, studies on new energy technologies find faster learning for younger technologies, with esti-
mates clustering around 15-20% for alternative energy sources such as wind and solar energy (McDonald 
and Schrattenholzer 2000).  
 
Table 3.2: Learning rates  
Study  Technology  Diffusion  Innovation 
Criqui et al (2000)  Wind  16 %  7 % 
Jamasab (2007)  Wind  13 %  26 % 
Söderholm and Klassens (2007)  Wind  3 %  13 % 
Klassens et al (2005)  Wind    13 % 
Criqui et al (2000)  PV  20 %  10 % 
Jamasab (2007)  Solar  2 %  5 % 
Jamasab (2007)  Nuclear  37 %  24 % 
Jamasab (2007)  CCGT  1 %  18 % 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics based on studies from the list 
 
One significant caveat with estimated learning rates is that they typically focus on correlations between 
energy technology usage and costs, rather than causation. Recent papers by Klaassens et al. (2005), 
Söderholm and Sundqvist (2007), and Söderholm and Klaassens (2007) attempt to disentangle the sepa-
rate contributions of R&D and experience by estimating “two-factor” learning curves for environmental 
technologies. These two-factor curves model cost reductions as a function of both cumulative capacity 
(learning-by-doing) and R&D (learning-by-searching, or LBS). To be comparable with the notion of cumu-
lative capacity, in these models R&D is typically aggregated into a stock of R&D capital. Thus, endogeneity 
is a concern, as we would expect both investments in capacity to be a function of past R&D expenditures 
and R&D expenditures to be influenced by capacity, which helps determine demand for R&D. Söderholm 
and Sundqvist address this endogeneity in their paper and find LBD rates around 5 percent, and LBS rates 
around 15 percent, suggesting that R&D, rather than learning-by-doing, contributes more to cost reduc-
tions. However, these results are very sensitive to the model specification, illustrating the difficulty of 
sorting through the various channels through which costs may fall over time. 
To further address the problems associated with estimating and interpreting learning curves, Nemet 
(2006) uses simulation techniques to decompose cost reductions for PV cells into seven categories. Plant 
size (e.g. returns to scale), efficiency improvements, and lower silicon costs explain the majority of cost 
reductions. Notably, most of the major improvements in efficiency come from universities, where tradi-
tional learning by doing through production experience would not be a factor. Learning from experience 
(e.g. through increased yield of PV cells) plays a much smaller role, accounting for just 10 percent of the 
cost decreases in Nemet’s sample.   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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price effects have around two to five year’s half-life on patents, implying that this phase in it-
self is considerable when considering the induced innovation hypothesis. The next phase 
concerns prototype development. After this stage, the technologies are largely classified by 
their cost-effectiveness compared to current market technologies. Some innovations may 
climb up the ladder rather quickly while others require longer development times, e.g., due 
to complementarities with other technologies.  
 









































Imposed market risk, 
guarenteedbut declining
minimum return
Development Niche markerts Mass market Time
Source:  Copenhagen Economics based on IEA (2008) 
 
There are four policy issues emerging from the figure. First, there is the question of the cy-
cle’s time length – what is realistically attained within a 10, 20 or 50 year timeframe? As just 
mentioned, the literature (including our own investigations) estimates that half of induced 
patents are accepted within ca. 2-5 years after the price or tax change. The other half takes 
longer. And since patents are just the first stage on a long journey towards final products, we 
must accept that we often work with very long time leads. 
 
Unfortunately, the empirical literature is not very helpful in determining normal time frames 
for the remaining stages of the innovation cycle. The obvious interest of policy makers is the 
accumulated time frame from tax intervention to market penetration of green technologies, 
so we may draw on some historical examples. This is the content of Table 3.3. The table 
shows the time from conception, typically measured by the patent application, to market 
maturity (production) for five selected green technologies. We draw on some quite old and 
some newer examples. In most cases, we find innovation cycles of +20 years, while only 
Warren Johnson’s room thermostat had a very short lead time from patent in 1883 to large-
scale production in 1885. 
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Table 3.3: Examples of innovation lead times 
Technology  Short description  Conception  Market matur-
ity 
Motor vehicle technologies      
Energy Saving Module  Ensure that compressors work at maximum ef-
ficiency 
1983 Post  2000 
EFI Electronic  fuel  injection  1952  1982 
End-of-pipe technologies      
Carbon capture and storage  Post-combustion  CO2  is  captured  and  stored 
geologically 
1977 Estimated  2008 
Room heating technologies      
CO2 heat pump system  Used for heating  1995  not yet 
 
Mineral wool  Used for thermal insulation  1840  1871 
Room thermostat  Regulate temperature of room or system  1883  1885 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
When lead times are significant, there are obvious implications for policy ambitions at dif-
ferent time horizons. We simply cannot expect R&D subsidies to contribute much to the 
agreed 2020 Kyoto targets (as seen from today.) However, in reaching much more substan-
tial reductions in 2050, it is much more reasonable to assume that innovation will play a role 
as discussed below.  
 
Stringency of policy targets 
The higher the policy ambition, the higher is the level of optimal private and public spend-
ing on climate related technologies. It should be clear from the previous discussions that low 
policy ambitions, e.g., low emission reduction targets, will imply relatively low value of 
R&D for the abaters: options based on existing technologies are cheaper. Instead, setting a 
high level of ambitions will imply a relatively high value of R&D, since current technologies 
are insufficient. 
 
A basic question is then how much more is optimal.  For example will going from a 20 per 
cent cut in emissions to 40 per cent emissions in the same time period, require more or less 
than a doubling of optimal RD support levels? 
 
The size of the optimal increase is driven by factors pulling in different directions. On the 
one hand, the larger the ambitions, the larger the distortions to consumer welfare by using 
only existing technologies for abatement.  This goes back to simple welfare economics as il-
lustrated in figure 3.2 above: the additional loss to society of accepting in period 1 a more 
ambitious target is 113(=173-60) which is substantially larger than accepting the lower level 
of ambition which equals 60 despite a less than proportional increase in the emission cut. So 
the potential value to society of R&D that can replace existing technology is an increasing 
function of the levels of ambitions.  This suggests that doubling the level of ambitions re-
quire more than a doubling of R&D expenditures. 
 
On the other hand, the marginal return on a net basis of yet more R&D efforts going into 
the energy sector is falling as the quality of each new additional research project. Moreover,   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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the costs of producing quality-adjusted research is going up for example as the marginal costs 
of loosing innovation and production elsewhere in the economy as more resources are pulled 
into energy research are rising. 
 
The magnitude also plays a role for the way subsidies to R&D should be assigned. Simplify-
ing quite a bit, we can state that subsidies to industrial R&D primarily obtain improvements 
in known technologies, and therefore primarily serve to shorten innovation cycles.
78 In con-
trast, subsidies to public fundamental research will serve to start entirely new inventions. So 
aiming for ambitious targets of 50-80 percent reduction suggests a larger fraction of R&D 
subsidies to public fundamental research. 
 
Consider, for instance, the case of solar energy.  Despite research efforts that began during 
the energy crises of the 1970s, solar energy is still only cost competitive in niche markets, 
such as remote off-grid locations. This leaves a potential role for government-sponsored 
R&D to fill in the gaps, particularly in the case of climate change, where a diversified energy 
portfolio will be necessary to meet currently proposed emission reduction targets.  
 
So the bottom line is: the more stringent the targets the larger the role of R&D support to 
support innovation focusing more on technology leaps as opposed to marginal improve-
ments of existing technologies where carbon pricing should do the main job. 
 
3.4.  THE EFFICIENT POLICY MIX OF CARBON PRICING AND R&D SUPPORT 
In this final section of the chapter, we will attempt to summarise the policy findings from 
above. Based on our previous results, we conclude that R&D support is particularly impor-
tant if: 
 
  knowledge spill- over externalities are high, 
  crowding out is limited, 
  high imbalance between desired and actual research stock for exampling resulting 
from adaptation of very ambitious long term climate and energy policies, 
  public costs of funding are low, 
  results from policy induced innovation come quick enough to help compliance 
with policy objective. 
 
Similarly, taxes are particularly important if: 
 
  pollution externalities are high, 
  long term price signals are missing, 
  end-of-pipe technologies are cost-efficient solutions to abatement, 
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  strong rebound effects are present (higher demand for fossil fuels induced by tech-
nology progress). 
 
According to the above discussion, the two main ingredients in defining the efficient policy 
mix are the respective externalities from knowledge and from pollution which need to be de-
fined in a long term perspective. The literature seems to suggest that pollution externalities 
are larger than knowledge externalities
79. Indeed, while all such calculations are very sensitive 
to parameter assumptions as well as the policy goals to be reached, a number of recent em-
pirical studies confirm the primacy of taxation and equivalent instruments in reaching long 
term climate and energy policy goals while also underlining the very useful role that direct 
RD support policies can deliver.
80  
 
•  A OECD study suggests that carbon pricing consistent with ambitious 2050 global 
goals could induce a “four-fold” increase in energy R&D expenditure while public 
R&D policies could most productively be focused on “major” technological break-
throughs” rather than marginal innovations
81. It also concludes that even a 30-fold 
increase in energy related R&D would be insufficient to stabilise emissions which is 
linked to some of the issues discussed in this study such as rebound effects. 
•  An EU study suggests that, in addition to much higher carbon prices, substantial, 
frontloaded R&D support is needed to adjust to ambitious long term climate 
goals
82. Other subsidy mechanisms are also investigated, but the combination of 
tightening emissions-caps (rising carbon prices) and up-front R&D support for 
green technologies yields the most favourable economic outcome. The study also 
concludes, similar to our previous findings, that R&D support must not favour 
green technologies in the long run and therefore suggests a phasing out of R&D 
support for green technologies by spreading it to all sectors of the economy. The 
results are based on a forward-looking, general equilibrium model of the European 
economy where R&D and innovation is specifically modelled. 
•   A study focusing on US compliance with climate policy objectives finds that car-
bon taxes alone achieves 95 per cent of the welfare gains compared to the first-best 
case of both an optimally-designed carbon tax (one equating the marginal benefits 
of carbon reductions with the marginal costs of such reductions) and optimally de-
signed R&D subsidies. By contrast, working with an optimal R&D subsidy alone 
attains just 11% of the welfare gains.  
•  A study on climate policies directed at the US electricity sector finds that the rank-
ing of potential policy instruments is roughly as follows: (1) emissions price/tax, (2) 
emissions performance standard, (3) fossil power tax, (4) renewables share require-
ment, (5) renewables subsidy, and (6) R&D subsidy. Nonetheless, an optimal port-
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folio of policies – including emissions pricing and R&D – achieves emission reduc-
tions at significantly lower costs than any single policy.  
   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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A.1 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the multivariate work, we restrict attention to countries with at least 1000 patents in the 
technology areas covered by this study. That leaves us with 33 countries over 30 years (1978-
2007). From these, we focus attention on countries with an average of at least 5 patents per 
year for each technology. Also, due to missing data in a number of the independent variables 
or the patent counts, the number of observations in the regression results will be substan-
tially lower than the potential 990 observations. 
 
Countries may differ – due to cultural reasons and unobserved economic variations – in 
their patenting propensity. We follow Johnstone et al. (2008) and OECD (2009) in employ-
ing quasi-static panel regressions with fixed-effects at the country level and, due to robust-
ness concerns, extend the analysis to include dynamic panel regressions too. We specify our 
static regression equation as follows: 
 
                                                         
 
where k denotes the country and t denotes time (in years). Pt is the total number of EPO 
patent filings in year t. This variable serves to capture common trends in patenting which are 
unrelated to patenting incentives for environmentally relevant technologies. Rkt is govern-
ment R&D in the technology of interest, and pkt is the price of a relevant energy input in 
country k and year t. The regressor Ikt reflects possible policy interventions, e.g., the an-
nouncement or the enactment of a European directive. The regression is estimated separately 
for the patenting areas of interest, such as lighting, LEDs, etc. 
 
Note that in this log-log specification, θ indicates the relative change in the number of pat-
ent filings in response to a relative change in the price level, i.e. an elasticity. More precisely, 
a unit coefficient would mean that for a positive (negative) change in price by ten percent, 
patent filings would increase (decrease) by approximately ten percent. For large changes in 
the price variable, this statement does not longer hold due to the non-linear nature of the re-
lationship and an explicit calculation is required. The advantage of estimating elasticities, 
their interpretation apart, is that we are able to compare estimates across technologies. 
 
We estimate the static equation above using standard fixed effects estimators. Johnstone et 
al. (2008) estimate a similar regression in a negative binomial framework. When we employ 
such count data estimators, we achieve almost identical results to our fixed effects regres-
sions. Therefore, we do not present them below. 
 
The dynamic model is specified as follows: 
 
                                                                                
 
That is, we introduce dynamics in the endogenous variable, patent counts, and in the ex-
planatory price variable(s). The advantage of this specification is twofold. First, we address 
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an econometric issue concerning potential inconsistency of the static estimator when the 
data is actually dynamic in nature.
83 There are valid reasons why patenting may happen in 
‘waves’: ideas foster ideas and R&D expenditure is typically assigned over longer time spans. 
Second, the formulation allows us to test hypotheses about the way prices and taxes influ-
ence patenting. If we simplify notation by joining all other explanatory variables in the con-
stant term, then we can rewrite the model as: 
 
∆           1                  
       
1  
            ∆            
 
This is the error correction representation of the model. The term in square brackets repre-
sents the long run relation between patents and prices, while the remaining terms describe 
short run adjustments. In this way we can test hypotheses of differences in short vs. long 
term impacts from price changes to patenting. The dynamic panel regression is estimated by 
deploying two estimators. First, we use the bias-corrected LSDV estimator suggested by 
Kiviet (1995). The advantage of this estimator is that it works significantly well for small-N 
samples, c.f. Bruno (2005). Standard errors are found by bootstrapping.  Second, we esti-
mate using the standard Arellano-Bond estimator – the classic dynamic panel data estimator. 
After estimation we test the significance of both the short run effects, i.e., the t-values for   , 
and the long run effects using Chi-square test for the long run coefficients in the square 
brackets. 
 
Note that we a priori value the static and the dynamic model equally. They are simply ro-
bustness controls of each other. However, if the estimate of the lagged dependent variable is 
statistically significant and large, we favour the dynamic estimates, whereas small estimates 
suggest that the more parsimonious static model is preferable. 
 
Finally, we also attempt to include taxes in the analysis. Our data on prices and taxes have 
the following additivity characteristic: 
 
       
              
 
Now, including taxes in the above regression would therefore cause multicollinearity prob-
lems. However, given the logarithmic transformation, we would violate the additivity char-
acteristic by using   
     instead. Thus, we need a different approach. Assuming that taxes 
may have a different impact on innovation than prices, we can postulate the following rela-
tion: 
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where ct captures all other variables (including the residual) and φ measures the additional 
effect from taxes. Note that φ = 0 means that taxes have the same impact as prices. In logs, 
this is approximated by log βlnp + βln(1+ φtax/p) . The second term can be approximated 
by φtax/p. This would call for using lnp (where price is inclusive of taxes) and the share vari-
able tax/p (the share of taxes in prices). This resolves the collinearity problem between prices 
and taxes – at least to some degree – and maintains a generalized form of additivity. The co-
efficient of the share variable then has the usual interpretation of an excess effect (positive 
coefficients indicate that taxes work more strongly than prices, vice versa for negative ef-
fects). Short and long run effects can now be calculated in the same way as shown for prices 
above. 
A.2 RESULTS 
Below we present results from the econometric estimations for each technology apart. How-
ever, the tables presenting regression output will have a similar structure across technologies: 
 
1.  Column (1) contains the coefficient estimates from the static model in its standard 
form. We include both residential and industry prices if relevant. 
2.  Column (2) contains the coefficient estimates from the static model including only 
the most relevant sector prices. 
3.  Column (3) contains the coefficient estimates from the dynamic model with price 
lags (leading to the error correction model). We include only the most relevant 
price series (residential or industry). This column is based on the Kiviet estimator. 
4.  Column (4) contains the estimates from the Arellano-Bond estimator for the same 
model as in column (3). 
 
All models include the tax share variable as based on the previous discussion. Furthermore, 
the below tables will refer to lags. These are lags as explained in the discussion of dynamic 
models, i.e., the inclusion of last year’s value of a specific variable instead of the current 
value. 
 
Thus, the specifications (1) and (2) are static, while (3) and (4) are dynamic. 
Patenting in Lighting Technology 
Lighting is a significant cause of energy consumption, yet it constitutes aa rather moderate 
share of consumer budgets. In order to explore the impact of energy prices on patenting in 
lighting technologies, we employ the country panel data and regress the logarithm of coun-
try-level patent counts on energy prices and taxes (both residential and industrial), public 
R&D in the underlying technologies, and dummy variables indicating both the announce-
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Determinants of Patenting in Lighting Technology 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ln price electricity 
(residential)   -0.397     
   (0.275)     
Tax share 
(residential)   1.010     
   (0.867)     
Ln price electricity 
(industrial) -0.418*** -0.225  -0.253  -0.163 
 (0.158)  (0.227)  (0.246)  (0.188) 
Tax share 
(industrial) 1.603***  1.053  1.672  1.526* 
 (0.615)  (0.721)  (1.313)  (0.916) 
 
Ln EPO  patents  0.621***  0.638***  0.251  0.425** 
 (0.206)  (0.213)  (0.188)  (0.183) 
ln public R&D 
(industrial) 0.0718*  0.0758*  0.00823  0.0304 
 (0.0424)  (0.0425)  (0.0454)  (0.0545) 
ln public R&D 
(residential) 0.0404  0.0355  0.0210  -0.00508 
 (0.0438)  (0.0440)  (0.0476)  (0.0460) 
 
EU Directive 2002/91 ann.  0.284***  0.319***  0.234**  0.251*** 
 (0.100)  (0.103)  (0.0947)  (0.0909) 
Lag tax share 
(industrial)     -1.088  -1.032 
     (1.735)  (1.009) 
Lag ln price electricity  
(industrial)     -0.224  -0.327 
     (0.220)  (0.235) 
Lag ln patents lighting 









Constant 1.800***  1.554***    -0.0129 
 (0.471)  (0.522)    (0.0171) 
        
Observations 233  233  224  207 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
  74
Patenting in LED Technology 
Light emitting diodes constitute a major technical breakthrough and have established a 
promising lighting technology in their own right. We test here if patenting in this technolo-
gical segment is determined by the same forces as lighting technology in general. The vari-
ables correspond to those used for lighting technologies.   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Determinants of Patenting in LED Technology 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln price electricity 
(residential) -0.248  -0.528  0.493  0.499 
  (0.461) (0.591) (0.940) (0.489) 
Ln price electricity 
(industrial)   0.0357    
   (0.455)    
Tax share 
(residential) -0.509  -2.797 -0.174 0.372 
  (1.225) (1.763) (1.681) (1.928) 
Tax share 
(industrial)   1.592     
   (1.476)    
ln public R&D  
(industrial) 0.00997  -0.00563  0.0475  0.0541 
 (0.0797)  (0.0786)  (0.0964)  (0.111) 
ln public R&D 
(residential) 0.161**  0.156*  0.0626  0.0439 
 (0.0802)  (0.0792)  (0.0733)  (0.0780) 
 
EU Directive 2002/91 ann.  0.282  0.325*  -0.0407  -0.0556 
  (0.180) (0.184) (0.171) (0.166) 
 
EU Directive 2002/91 intr.  -0.128 -0.401  -0.0527  -0.0116 
  (0.220) (0.256) (0.167) (0.193) 
Lag tax share 
(residential)     0.357  -2.099 
     (2.144)  (1.611) 
Lag ln price electricity  
(residential)     -0.773  -1.061** 
     (0.998)  (0.540) 
 
Lag ln patents LED      0.560***  0.453*** 
     (0.0601)  (0.120) 
 
Constant -0.907  -1.012     
 (0.801)  (0.930)     
      
Observations  199 194 193 181 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Patenting in Boiler Technology 
The relevant price variable for driving incentives in the area of boiler technology could either 
be the price for natural gas (or other gas fuels) as well as the price for light fuel oil. However, 
the results for light fuel oil have slightly better economic interpretation and we choose to 
present these here. Light fuel oil costs simply appear to have a bigger effect than natural gas. 
The public R&D variable is not significant in these regressions. 
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Determinants of Patenting in Boiler Technology 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ln price light fuel oil  
(residential)   0.0999  0.0999  -0.140  -0.0788 
 (0.0948)  (0.0948)  (0.104)  (0.125) 
tax share 
(residential) 0.951*  1.421***  1.303***  1.303*** 
 (0.522)  (0.274)  (0.340)  (0.340) 
 
ln EPO patents  -0.235  -0.235 -0.348  -0.392** 
 (0.198)  (0.198)  (0.212)  (0.165) 
ln public R&D  
(residential) -0.0130  -0.0130 0.000391 -0.0338 
 (0.0362)  (0.0362)  (0.0291)  (0.0325) 
lag ln price light fuel oil 
(residential)     0.223  0.0907 
     (0.140)  (0.135) 
lag tax share 
(residential)     -0.0997  0.0582 
     (0.634)  (0.542) 
 
lag ln patents boilers      0.635***  0.246*** 
     (0.0557)  (0.0643) 
lag ln price light fuel oil  
(residential)     0.223  0.0907 
     (0.140)  (0.135) 
 
Constant 1.606**  1.606**     
 (0.637)  (0.637)     
        
Observations 276  276  266  251 
Standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
Patenting in Biomass Technology in Buildings 
We take again the prices for light fuel oil and for natural gas as the potentially relevant en-
ergy costs which determine incentives for investments and patenting in biomass technology. 
Again, the price for light fuel oil yields the most intuitive results, so only these are included. 
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Determinants of Patenting in Biomass 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ln price light fuel oil  
(residential)   0.318**  0.318**  0.709***  0.719*** 
 (0.135)  (0.135)  (0.237)  (0.246) 
tax share 
(residential) -1.957***  -1.957*** -1.172  -1.168 
 (0.569)  (0.569)  (0.783)  (0.800) 
 
ln EPO patents  0.114  0.114  0.554**  0.555 
        
ln public R&D  
(residential) -0.0351  -0.0351 -0.0208 -0.0202 
 (0.0580)  (0.0580)  (0.0597)  (0.0658) 
 
lag ln patents biomass      0.358***  0.313*** 
     (0.0680)  (0.0757) 
lag ln price light fuel oil  
(residential)     -0.498**  -0.491*** 
     (0.201)  (0.146) 
lag tax share 
(residential)     -0.422  -0.514 
     (0.925)  (0.354) 
 
Constant 1.121  1.121    0 
 (0.916)  (0.916)    (0) 
        
Observations 188  188  182  175 
Standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
Patenting in Ventilation Technology 
Relevant prices for patenting in ventilation technologies are again for electricity (residential 
and industrial). For this technology group, the variables capturing the timing of the directive 
2002/91 are slightly significant together with one of the country-specific R&D variables. 
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Determinants of Patenting in Ventilation Technology 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln price electricity 
(industrial) -0.387*  -0.431  -0.314  -0.291 
  (0.197) (0.272) (0.230) (0.394) 
tax share 
(industrial) 1.777**  1.849**  0.718  0.699 
  (0.798) (0.889) (1.024) (0.699) 
 
ln EPO trend  -0.296  -0.305 -0.336 -0.356 
  (0.285) (0.289) (0.371) (0.270) 
ln public R&D  
(industrial)  -0.0159 -0.0134 -0.0171 -0.0179 
  (0.0497) (0.0507) (0.0627) (0.0331) 
ln public R&D  
(residential)  0.142*** 0.144*** 0.130***  0.132* 
  (0.0479) (0.0490) (0.0476) (0.0701) 
EU Directive  
2002/91 ann.  0.134  0.126  0.111  0.113* 
  (0.121) (0.125) (0.104)  (0.0685) 
EU Directive  
2002/91  impl.  -0.274 -0.273 -0.285 -0.279 
  (0.179) (0.181) (0.214) (0.213) 
 
lag ln patents ventilation      0.0927  0.0503 
     (0.0753)  (0.0636) 
lag tax share 
(industrial)     1.431  1.550 
     (1.210)  (1.608) 
lag ln price electricity 
(industrial)     -0.168  -0.215 
     (0.223)  (0.533) 
 
Constant 0.245  0.217    0.0246 
 (0.641)  (0.716)    (0.0227) 
      
Observations  190 190 184 175 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Patenting in Fuel Efficiency for Motor Vehicles 
Since a large number of patents in this field come from car and truck manufacturers in 
Germany, France and Italy – with considerable investments in diesel technology for passen-
ger cars and trucks – the price for diesel fuel is the first relevant price variable. Also this price 
variable is the only with consistent data coverage over time. The selection of the appropriate 
g a s o l i n e  f u e l  p r i c e s  i s  c o m p l i c a t e d  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  l e a d e d  g a s o l i n e  b e c a m e  r e p l a c e  b y  
unleaded variants in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, we focus exclusively on 
automotive diesel prices, remembering that most car fuel prices move very much in tandem 
over longer horizons. 
 
Determinants of Patenting in Motor Fuel Efficiency 
    (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 
ln retail price diesel fuel  0.223  0.223  0.392  0.484 
  (0.206) (0.206) (0.308)  (0.329) 
 
tax share  2.132***  2.132***  1.110  1.826 
  (0.352) (0.352) (1.162)  (1.193) 
 
ln public R&D in transportation  0.125***  0.125***  0.0463  0.110* 
  (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0502)  (0.0579) 
 
lag ln patents motor fuel efficiency      0.667***  0.399*** 
     (0.0736)  (0.137) 
 
lag tax share      -0.380  -1.798 
     (1.137)  (1.186) 
 
lag ln retail price diesel fuel      -0.365  -0.467** 
     (0.251)  (0.207) 
 
Constant 1.936***  1.936***    0.0238*** 
 (0.203)  (0.203)    (0.00907) 
       
Observations  193 193 186  176 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Patenting in Pulp and Paper Manufacturing 
In 2008, the European Commission announced the Best Available Techniques Reference 
Documents (BREFs) - IPCC Directive which targeted explicitly the pulp and paper manu-
facturing sector. Since the data series used here end with year 2008, the impact of this direc-
tive cannot be ascertained from data presently available.   Innovation of energy technologies: the role of taxes 
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Determinants of Patenting in Pulp and Paper Manufacturing 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ln price electricity 
(industrial) 0.352***  0.352***  0.188  0.184 
 (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.239)  (0.285) 
tax share 
(industrial) -0.547  -0.547  -0.851  -1.181** 
 (0.485)  (0.485)  (0.846)  (0.590) 
 
ln EPO patents  0.320**  0.320**  0.165  0.220* 
 (0.158)  (0.158)  (0.164)  (0.118) 
 
lag ln patents paper and pulp      0.475***  0.0842 
     (0.0466)  (0.0856) 
 
lag tax share      0.700  0.306 
     (0.911)  (0.612) 
lag ln price electricity 
(industrial)     0.0573  0.155 
     (0.197)  (0.114) 
Constant 4.264***  4.264***    0.0143 
 (0.342)  (0.342)    (0.0103) 
        
Observations 298  298  285  273 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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The model is closely linked to the model developed in Fisher and Newell (2008). In fact, the 
CERIM is a simplification of their model in order to focus exclusively on relevant policy op-
tions. A more thorough model description can be found in the original paper. 
 
The CERIM includes two subsectors, one emitting (fossil fuels) and one non-emitting (re-
newables), and both are assumed to be perfectly competitive and supplying an identical 
product, electricity. Fossil-fuelled production includes a CO2-intensive technology (coal) 
that operates primarily as a base load and a lower-emitting technology (gas turbines) that 
dominates at the margin. To the extent that renewable energy is competitive, it displaces 
marginal fossil-fuelled generation. We therefore treat nuclear- and hydro-based generation as 
ﬁxed in response to the range of policies we model, a reasonable assumption based on other 
detailed models (see the Numerical application). The model has two stages, each represent-
ing a speciﬁc number of years. Electricity generation, consumption, and emissions occur in 
both stages, while investment in knowledge takes place in the ﬁrst stage and, through tech-
nological change, lowers the cost of renewables generation in the second. An important as-
sumption is that ﬁrms take not only current prices as given, but also take prices in the sec-
ond stage as given, having perfect foresight about those prices. 
 
To allow for consideration of the length of time it takes for innovation to occur, and for the 
lifetime of the new technologies, let the ﬁrst and second stages be made up of n1 and n2 
years, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that no discounting occurs within the ﬁrst 
stage; this assures that behaviour within that stage is constant. However, let δ represent the 
discount factor between stages. It is possible to allow for discounting within the second, 
longer stage by altering n2 to reﬂect such a discounting; in that case n2 can be thought of as 
‘‘effective’’ years. 
 
The emitting sector of the generation industry, denoted with superscript F, relies on two fos-
sil fuels for production: coal, x, and natural gas, y. Total output from the emitting sector is  
 
              
 
in year t. Total emissions from this sector equal 
 
                 
 
as each fuel has a ﬁxed CO2 intensity. Marginal production costs coal-ﬁred generation is 
given by 
 
                            
 /2 
 
and similarly for natural gas. The opportunities for CO2 abatement in electricity rely largely 
on fuel switching; although coal gasiﬁcation or generation efﬁciency improvements are op-
tions, they tend to explain little of the predicted reductions in climate policy models. One 
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policy affects the fossil-fuelled sector directly: an emissions price/tax denoted by τt . This 
gives rise to an intertemporal profit function for the emitting firms: 
 
                                           
                                            
 
We assume profit maximisation. 
 
Another sector of the industry generates without emissions by using renewable resources 
(wind, for example). Annual output from the renewables sector is qt. The costs of 
production, G Kt,qt , are assumed to be increasing and convex in output, and declining and 
convex in its own knowledge stock, Kt, in the following way: 
 
     ,         
         





Note that we have simpliﬁed considerably by assuming there is technological change in the 
relatively immature renewable energy technologies, but none in the relatively mature fossil-
fueled technologies. While it is not strictly true that fossil-fueled technologies will experience 
no further advance, incorporation of positive but relatively slower innovation in fossil fuels 
would complicate the analysis without adding much additional insight. 
 
The knowledge stock is a function of cumulative knowledge from R&D, Ht, and of 
cumulative experience through learning by doing, Qt. Cumulative R&D-based knowledge 
increases in proportion to annual R&D knowledge generated in each stage, ht, so 
 
               
 
Cumulative experience increases with total output during the ﬁrst stage in a completely simi-
lar manner 
 
               
 
Research expenditures, R ht , are increasing and convex in the amount of new R&D knowl-
edge generated in any one year, with  
 
            
   
 
The strictly positive marginal costs imply that real resources—specialized scarce inputs, em-
ployees, and equipment—must be expended to gain any new knowledge. As a partial equi-
librium model, we do not explicitly explore issues of crowding out in the general economy, 
but those opportunity costs may be reﬂected in the R&D cost function. 
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The second policy instrument in the model is a subsidy targeted at R&D in renewable. The 
subsidy, σ, is implemented as the government offsetting a share research expenditures. Now, 
we can write up the intertemporal profit function for the renewables sector: 
 
       1         ,        1              2            ,      
 
The model is closed by the standard demand equals supply condition: 
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APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTION OF IPC CODES